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Abstract 
Depression is highly prevalent, but its evolutionary origin is poorly understood. Evolutionary 
psychology generates hypotheses on the computational and functional design architectures of 
the human mind. Evolutionary medicine and evolutionary psychopathology study the design 
characteristics of adaptations that make humans vulnerable to diseases. These perspectives 
are necessary when attempting to answer why complex traits exist in living organisms. Some 
theoreticians postulate that depression is an adaptation that solves particular problems, such 
as reducing the risk of being socially excluded, elicit help from others, or to analyze complex 
problems. Others view depression as an evolutionary side-effect of pathogen host defense, 
and others still view depression as dysfunctions of adaptive mood-mechanisms. The purpose 
of this paper is to discuss predictions from all evolutionary theories, and make new testable 
predictions from them. I will also discuss predictions from evolutionary theories on why 
women are more likely to be depressed than men (~2:1). I argue that research on normal 
sadness, or “low-mood” states are likely to illuminate our understanding of when depressed 
mood is working as designed and when it is malfunctioning.  
  
Keywords: evolution; depression; sadness; mood; disorder; dysfunction; sex 
differences; evolutionary psychology; evolutionary psychopathology; theories; hypothesis 
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Sammendrag 
Depresjon er svært utbredt, men dens evolusjonære opprinnelse er uklar. 
Evolusjonspsykologi genererer hypoteser om sinnets informasjonsprosesserende og 
funksjonelle design. Evolusjonsmedisin og evolusjonspsykopatologi studerer 
designkarakteristikkene til menneskets tilpasninger og hvordan disse kan gjøre mennesket 
sårbar for sykdommer. Disse perspektivene er nødvendige for å kunne svare på hvorfor 
komplekse trekk eksisterer i levende organismer. Noen teoretikere postulerer at depresjon er 
en tilpasning som løser spesifikke problemer, som å redusere risiko for å bli sosialt eksludert, 
utløse hjelp fra andre, eller analysere komplekse problemer. Andre ser på depresjon som en 
evolusjonær side-effekt av menneskers immunologiske forsvar mot patogener, mens andre 
ser på depresjon som dysfunksjoner av adaptive mekanismer som styrer stemningsleie. 
Hensikten med denne artikkelen er å diskutere prediksjoner fra alle evolusjonære teorier om 
hvorfor depresjon eksisterer og danne nye testbare prediksjoner fra teoriene. Jeg vil også 
diskutere prediksjoner fra evolusjonære teorier om hvorfor kvinner har større sjanse for å bli 
deprimerte enn menn (~2:1). Jeg argumenterer for at forskning på det evolusjonære designet 
til normal tristhet (eller lavt stemningsleie) vil forbedre vår forståelse av når depresjon og 
tristhet fungerer som designet av seleksjon og når disse tilstandene har blitt dysfunksjonelle.       
 
Stikkord: evolusjon; depresjon; tristhet; stemningsleie; sykdom; dysfunksjon; 
kjønnsforskjeller; evolusjonspsykologi; evolusjonspsykopatologi; teorier; hypoteser 
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Human depression is an evolutionary paradox. Depression is deeply debilitating and 
costly to its sufferers, yet it is highly prevalent. The lifetime estimate for Major Depressive 
Disorder (MDD) in North-America is 16.2% (Kessler et al., 2003). Depression is estimated 
(C. Murray & Lopez, 1997) to become the world’s greatest cause of, only surpassed by heart 
disease, disability and mortality in 2020. Sufferers of depression typically lose all interest in 
pleasant activities; thinks and moves slowly; have trouble concentrating; experience either 
weight loss or gain; either insomnia or excessive sleep; feels sad, worthless, guilty and have 
thoughts about death and suicide (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; World Health 
Organization, 1992).  
However, clinical depression aside, most humans are capable of experiencing the 
blues. Melancholia is a recurrent theme in the great literature, painting and music of our 
world. Sadness is ubiquitous—it is found, and recognized (Ekman et al., 1987), in all 
cultures. For example, most humans experience a dramatic, yet normal, grief and sadness at 
the loss of loved ones (Bowlby, 1980/1996), including our pets (Adrian, Deliramich, & 
Frueh, 2009; Gosse & Barnes, 1994). Depression, too, has been observed in traditional 
hunter-gatherer societies such as the !Kung of the Kalahari desert in southern Africa (Howell, 
1979/2000), suggesting it has been a part of human nature for a long time. Indeed, Darwin 
(1872/1998) noted that human and non-human apes portrayed similar facial expressions in 
situations where they were depressed, which strongly suggests that sadness is an ancient 
phylogenetic trait (cross-species adaptation), likely to have evolved in the common ancestors 
of the great apes. Sadness might be evolutionary useful (Nesse, 2000). Or as Forgas (2007) 
put it, there might be “evolutionary advantages of not being too happy” (p. 107). Indeed, in 
four experiments conducted by Forgas (2007), the induction of sadness made people produce 
more concrete, persuasive, and higher-quality arguments, which was more likely to change 
other people’s attitudes. In another study (Forgas & East, 2008) sadness was shown, relative 
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to neutral and happy mood, to improve accuracy in the detection of deceptive 
communication. There are many examples in the scientific literature (e.g. Raghunathan & 
Pham, 1999) of how sadness improves motivation, interpersonal behavior, memory, and 
judgment in particular ways (for a review, see Forgas, 2013). Keller and Nesse (2005) have 
argued that natural selection shaped subtypes of low mood, and they found evidence that 
specific situations lead to the different “symptoms” of low mood that they predicted, such as 
crying under social losses and fatigue when one failed to reach a goal.  
The findings above suggest that transient sadness, or low-mood, have particular 
effects on information-processing in humans that might be useful. However, we know little 
on the evolutionary function, if any, of sadness and the relationship it might have with 
clinical depression. 
If normal sadness is useful, what about mild and severe depression? In the scientific 
literature, depression has been associated with many different traits, which makes depression 
very complex and multifaceted. Depression, in both mild and major forms, independently 
predicts earlier death in elderly people (Schulz et al., 2000), it predicts cardiovascular disease 
and suicide (Mykletun et al., 2007), affective disorders cause 25 work loss days per month 
per 100 workers (Kessler & Frank, 1997), Major depression is associated with 
neurophysiological abnormalities in the medial and prefrontal cortex (Drevets, 2000), and 
cognitive deficits (Austin, Mitchell, & Goodwin, 2001; Hammar, Lund, & Hugdahl, 2003). 
Furthermore, depression is highly correlated with guilt and negative social comparison 
(O’Connor, Berry, Weiss, & Gilbert, 2002), and shame and rumination (Cheung, Gilbert, & 
Irons, 2004). Depression is associated with elevated body temperatures (Rausch et al., 2003) 
and reductions in bodily iron storage (Maes et al., 1996), and other inflammatory markers 
(see Raison, Capuron, & Miller, 2006), and is associated with decreased appetite (Paykel, 
1977) but also with carbohydrate-cravings (Wurtman & Wurtman, 1995). And depression is 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES ON WHY DEPRESSION EXIST  11 
 
more common in women, than in men (~2:1) (Lopez, Mathers, Ezzati, Jamison, & Murray, 
2006). 
Some of these factors are obviously detrimental to survival and reproduction, so why 
does depression exist at all? Why has not natural selection eliminated the risk-alleles that 
make so many humans vulnerable to depression? Is depression an evolutionary function 
executed by the brain in specific situations? Or is depression the result of dysfunctional mood 
systems? Either way, when is depression a dysfunction, and when can we safely consider 
depression as an emotional system working as designed by natural selection? 
The evolutionary hypotheses described in this article try to address these questions, 
albeit with very different, and sometimes contradictory, predictions. They also have unique 
problems. For example, adaptationist theories must explain why depression is so costly for 
the individual (Sloman, 2000), and nonadaptive theories must explain why depression is so 
prevalent.  
All traits that we observe in biological organisms (phenotypes) can be divided into 
four categories. 1) The trait can be the workings of an adaptation (e.g. eyes, muscles, fear in 
the presence of predators); 2) be side-effects of adaptations (e.g. human belly-buttons, see 
Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998); or 3) the trait can simply be the 
product of fitness-irrelevant, genetic “noise” (Confer et al., 2010), and 4) a trait can be a 
dysfunction of an adaptation, caused by, for example mutations or abnormal development. 
The evolutionary theories of depression can be divided into these categories: adaptive, side-
effect, noise and dysfunction. Although no theory described here postulates that depression 
can be categorizes as fitness-neutral “noise”—it is either viewed as adaptive, as a side-effect 
of adaptations or as a dysfunction. 
Some theories claim that depression, including MDD, has evolved to solve complex 
problems and to elicit help from others (Andrews & Thomson, 2009; Hagen, 2003; Watson & 
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Andrews, 2002). In other words, depression is hypothesized to be an adaptation that has, in 
certain contexts, helped our ancestors to survive and reproduce, and is now a part of human 
nature. Other theories hypothesize that depression is a side-effect of other adaptations, such 
as defending against pathogens (Raison & Miller, 2012). Lastly, some evolutionary theories 
view depression as nonadaptive: As a continuum around an adaptive peak of neuroticism 
(Nettle, 2004), or that major depression is best explained as a manifestation of the hundreds 
of mutations that all individuals carry, many of which affect the brain (Keller & Miller, 2006) 
Opinions on the function of depression vary widely, from mainstream notions in 
psychiatry that all depression, even low mood, is an illness, to the view that MDD is a 
normal, functional reaction (Nesse, 2000). It might be unreasonable to expect that one theory 
should account for the existence of all types of melancholic states, from mild to severe, in 
addition to all the fitness-damaging traits described above. The complexity suggests that 
depression is unlikely to be one single phenomenon. Nevertheless, the existence of 
depression is still a scientific mystery, which is not yet understood under a coherent whole 
(Hagen, 2003). And more empirical work on the existing theories is needed before we can 
tell. 
The purpose of this article 
The present purpose is to discuss predictions from all evolutionary hypotheses on why 
depression exists and why it differs between the sexes. The predictions are numbered and 
collected in the appendix. Most of those predictions are discussed in the text, and are referred 
to by their number. The predictions are either directly derived from the relevant articles, 
while others are new for this article, made with the logic of the theories in mind. This article 
starts by presenting relevant principles from evolutionary psychology, evolutionary medicine 
and evolutionary psychopathology. Then we move on to discuss predictions from the 
adaptive theories, and the theories on the sex difference in depression. This is followed by a 
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discussion of the side-effect hypotheses of depression, and finally the dysfunction views.    
The term “depressives” is often used in this article, this term is solely for the sake of 
simplicity. Its meaning is an individual who currently, or has in the past, experienced some of 
the symptoms of depression as defined by the ICD or DSM diagnostic systems. It does not 
mean that depressed individuals are always experiencing depression, or that depression is a 
category of humans. Another term I use is “adaptive”. In this article, “adaptive” always refer 
to evolutionary adaptations. Not, as it is sometimes used in psychological literature, to 
describe individuals who favorably adjust to some unfortunate situation.    
Evolutionary Psychology 
Is it not reasonable to anticipate that our understanding of the human mind would be 
aided greatly by knowing the purpose for which it was designed? (Williams, 1966/1996, p. 
16). 
Evolutionary psychology (EP) is the attempt to understand the architecture of the 
mind by understanding the evolutionary processes that shaped it (Pinker, 2009). EP is the 
marriage of cognitive science and modern evolutionary biology: The brain is a complex 
information-processor and it has been shaped by natural selection (Cosmides & Tooby, 
2013). In EP, complex human behavior is viewed as the functional output from psychological 
mechanisms (also known as Darwinian algorithms, modules, psychological adaptations) that 
evolved in our ancestors. These psychological mechanisms are, in turn, dependent on internal 
and environmental inputs for their development, expression and activation (Buss, 1995a; 
Confer et al., 2010; Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). Evolutionary psychology, then, is the 
“missing link” (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987) between evolution and behavior: The functional 
psychological mechanisms that generates behavior based on input from the internal or 
external environment.  
Darwin (1859/1998) ingeniously observed that organisms vary in their abilities to 
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survive and reproduce and that “there is a struggle for existence leading to the preservation 
[italics added] of each profitable deviation of structure or instinct” (Darwin, 1998, p. 346). 
Hence, the occasional useful change in an organism’s genetic code that came up during the 
deep time of evolution, or “good trick” as Dennett (1995) has called it, which made an 
organisms slightly more effective in replicating their genes (see Dawkins, 1986/2008) will, 
by definition, eventually spread themselves throughout a population. This means that the 
genes responsible for these fitness-enhancing traits (the good tricks) reach fixation. 
Eventually these traits—adaptations—are all “preserved” in what we would recognize as the 
nature of a species. In the observable universe, this process is the only known causal 
mechanism behind complex biological functionality, or the apparent “design” of life (Buss, 
1995a; Dawkins, 1986/2008; Kennair, 2002).  
Proximate and ultimate causation. Darwin’s insights, then, allows us to ask 
penetrating how and why questions on the traits we observe in biological organisms (e.g. 
flight, echolocation, altruism, mating rituals). “How questions” investigate what biologists 
and evolutionary psychologists call proximate factors, this is the immediate causes—how 
does this trait work and develop? “Why questions”, on the other hand, investigate what is 
called ultimate factors (sometimes called distal or simply evolutionary)—why does this trait 
exist at all? (Confer et al., 2010).  
Nikolaas Tinbergen (1963) famously formalized proximate and ultimate causation 
into two proximate, and two ultimate questions. Nesse (1990), in turn, has exemplified 
Tinbergen’s questions with emotions: 1) What is the physiological, psychological, and 
behavioral mechanisms of the emotion? Which cues elicits the emotion?; 2) what is the 
ontogeny of the emotion (how does it develop over a lifetime)?; 3) what was the function of 
the emotional capacity that increased fitness over evolutionary time? In what situations (such 
as threats, opportunities) is it adaptive? What is the adaptive significance of the changes in 
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physiology, cognition and behavior?; and 4) what is the phylogeny of the emotional capacity? 
That is, the interspecial evolutionary history of the emotion. Question one and two is 
proximate (how) questions, while three and four is ultimate (why) questions. For a full 
understanding of a complex biological trait, all these four questions must be answered. And, 
importantly, proximate and ultimate explanations are complimentary; they never compete 
with each other. Traditional psychological and neuroscientific perspectives often produce 
sophisticated understandings of proximate mechanisms, but they lack half of the story. A 
description of only the proximate mechanisms that were involved in behavior (such as 
neurotransmitters, activation of an emotion, peer-pressure and so on—the immediate factors) 
is insufficient. Hence, it has been argued by many that a mature psychological science must 
include the ultimate level of explanation (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Buss, 1995a, 
2005; Confer et al., 2010; Haselton & Nettle, 2006; Kennair, 2002).  
David Marr, an advocate of the computational theory of the mind, emphasized that 
“an algorithm is likely to be understood more readily by understanding the nature of the 
problem being solved than by examining the mechanism (and the hardware) in which it is 
embodied” (1982/2010, p. 27). Hence, answers to ultimate questions is not explanatory 
ornamentation on existing psychological theories, nor is it the evolutionary perspective a 
subfield of psychology. It is a fundamentally integrating, non-reductionist, true 
biopsychosocial perspective; a meta-theory, which can generate hypotheses and bind together 
anything in psychology in a theoretically coherent framework (Buss, 1995a; Kennair, 2002), 
just as it has in the other life-sciences for over 150 years (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Clinical 
psychology is no exception to this. Brüne (2008) argued that it is a common misconception in 
psychiatry that to understand early development and the neurochemistry of the brain is 
sufficient to understand the pathology of cognitive, emotional and behavioral systems. That 
provides only the answers to ontogeny and physiology. It is essential to add the 
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complementary ultimate level of analysis (Brüne, 2008). It is not untrue to say that men are, 
on average, taller than women because men have taller leg-bones. However, we also have to 
ask why this is the case. Similarly, it might also be correct to say that depression is 
associated, for example, with reduced monoamine activity, or the experience of loss, but 
“why” is that the case?   
Multimodularity. A good pump requires some amount of mechanical force, a good 
oxygenator requires a large surface area in which to exchange gases. That is why the heart (a 
muscle) pumps blood, and the lungs oxygenate the blood: neither can effectively do both. 
They solve different evolutionary problems. The body, then, can be described as 
mutimodular: Evolutionary problems are not solved effectively with one tool (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1994b; Nesse & Williams, 1996). This is also true for the human brain. It can be seen 
as many organs (Kurzban, 2012), which evolved, like the heart, liver, immune systems and 
lungs, to solve specific adaptive problems during human evolutionary history (Nesse & 
Williams, 1996; Williams & Nesse, 1991), that is, during the Environment of Evolutionary 
Adaptedness (EEA). The visual system of humans, for example, process contours, texture, 
brightness, and so on differently (Marr, 1982/2010)—specific solutions to specific problems. 
How many, and how specific, the minds modules are, is still an open question which is 
debated and empirically explored within cognitive science and evolutionary psychology. For 
example, are all modules highly domain-specific? Or are some domain-general, like fluid 
intelligence? (See Barrett & Kurzban, 2006, for a review of the debate). However, due to the 
flexibility and complexity of human behavior, we can be reasonably confident that natural 
selection armed the human brain with more than just a few domain-general psychological 
mechanisms (e.g. operant conditioning). If we want an information-processing system, for 
example a computer, or a smartphone, to be flexible and complex—to solve many problems, 
it has to contain, maybe somewhat counterintuitively, many programs (or “instincts”, 
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“algorithms”, “mechanisms”, or “modules”) in their software (Barrett, 2012; Kurzban, 2012). 
A logic that William James (James, 1890/2011, p. 236) early pointed out: “a creature which 
has few instinctive impulses, or interests, practical or æsthetic, will dissociate few characters, 
and will, at best, have limited reasoning powers; whilst one whose interests are very varied 
will reason much better”. The behavior that is produced by the human nervous system is 
obviously complicated and flexible, which requires a certain richness of psychological 
mechanisms; humans have a nature (Kurzban, 2012; Pinker, 2003). Is depression an evolved 
module, or modules?     
Evolutionary psychology as a prediction-generating tool. Like any good scientific 
theory, evolution is an excellent generator of testable hypotheses. Evolutionary theories are 
hierarchically organized and contain several levels of explanation (Simpson & Campbell, 
2005). Evolution by selection is the overarching theory from which “middle-level” 
evolutionary theories such as reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), parental investment 
(Trivers, 1972), parent-offspring conflict (Trivers, 1974) are formulated. This, in turn, leads 
to specific predictions. For example, from Parental-investment theory we can hypothesize 
that if males sometimes contribute resources to offspring, females will select mates based on 
their willingness to contribute resources to their offspring; women will be more “choosy” 
when picking mates (Buss, 1995a). This hypothesis, in turn, can lead us to three specific 
predictions (Buss, 1995a): 1) Women have evolved preferences for high-status men, 2) 
Women have evolved preferences for men who portray cues of willingness to invest 
resources in offspring, and 3) Women will divorce men who fail to deliver the expected 
resources, or who diverts them to other women or their children (Buss, 1995a). Indeed, Buss 
(1989) found, amongst other things, that, in the 37 cultures that he studied, males prefer 
young and physically attractive (fertile) mates; and women prefer cues to resource acquisition 
(such as ambition and industriousness) (see also Grøntvedt & Kennair, 2013). With the use of 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES ON WHY DEPRESSION EXIST  18 
 
evolutionary logic from middle-level theories, EP has grown to be a mature, empirical 
science (Buss, 2009). An example of a well-established empirical finding is in human 
reasoning about social exchanges. It has been empirically supported that humans have 
cognitive (Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992) and neural adaptations (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 2005; Stone, Cosmides, Tooby, Kroll, & Knight, 2002) for content-specific detection 
and punishment (Delton, Cosmides, Guemo, Robertson, & Tooby, 2012) of cheaters in social 
exchanges across cultures (Sugiyama, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2002). Another example is a 
psychological mechanism for kin-detection and incest-avoidance (Debra Lieberman, Tooby, 
& Cosmides, 2003, 2007). There are also several evolutionary psychological hypotheses 
which have been refuted (Buss, 2008), for example the hypothesis that male homosexuality 
was maintained through kin selection (inclusive fitness) has now been falsified (Bobrow & 
Bailey, 2001; Rahman & Hull, 2005). When data do not support the predictions from an 
evolutionary middle-level hypothesis, like in the rest of science, we must return to the 
drawing board to attempt a better translation of the middle-level hypothesis, or reject it 
altogether (Ketelaar & Ellis, 2000). 
What is an adaptation?  
“Evolutionary adaptation is a special and onerous concept that should not be used 
unnecessarily, and an effect should not be called a function unless it is clearly produced by 
design and not by chance” (Williams, 1966/1996, p. V). 
Adaptations can be defined this way: “Adaptations are mechanisms or systems of 
properties “designed” by natural selection to solve the specific problems posed by the 
regularities of the physical, chemical, ecological, informational, and social environments 
encountered by the ancestors of a species during the course of its evolution” (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1990, p. 383). Now, Williams quote above illustrate an important point on 
adaptations: They are, by definition, overwhelmingly unlikely to be the product of chance. A 
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human eye, for example, is clearly adapted for detecting the light that reflects off objects in 
the world. The likelihood for such a complex organ too arise by chance, is practically zero 
(Dawkins, 1986/2008). Adaptations must show evidence of design. However, this does not 
mean that everything about an organism, even the ones that look useful, is an adaptation. It 
can also be side-effects, noise or malfunctions. However, many psychological traits show 
evidence of design. For example, humans do not choose partners to cooperate with, or to 
mate with, at random: It is particular traits that are desired, suggesting that it is the functional 
output from some information-processing unit housed in the brain—chance cannot explain it. 
If we suspect that there has been some adaptive problem in our evolutionary past which has 
produced some particular, complex designs in the brain—an evolutionary hypothesis—we 
can test whether modern humans indeed are capable of efficiently solving the problem(s) that 
our hypothesis predicts. As Randy Thornhill (1997, p. 4) points out “If selection created a 
trait, that trait will be functionally designed for the ecological problem generating the 
selection - the selective force - that created it.” 
Hence, we can reverse-engineer the trait that we hypothesize to have evolved. If a trait 
is efficient and economical, specialized and reliably develops in all members of a species 
(Thornhill, 1997; Williams, 1966/1996), it is likely an adaptation. If depression (or indeed 
any other trait) is an adaptation, then, we would expect the adaptation to portray four 
hallmarks (Nettle, 2004): 1) lack heritable variation. A disclaimer is appropriate here. Genes 
produce proteins, which in turn produce design in information-processing neural structures 
(psychological mechanism); all psychological design is therefore genetic design (Kennair, 
2002). However, because adaptations quickly spread and become species-typical (everyone 
have the adaptive gene variants), adaptations should lack “heritability” as traditionally 
defined by behavioral geneticists. There are no phenotypic differences attributable to 
differences in gene-variants (alleles, polymorphisms) therefore the adaptation has “0” 
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heritability. The only exceptions to this is when adaptive genetic variance is maintained by 
balancing selection, for example negative frequency-dependent selection, or the adaptation is 
still in the process of reaching fixation; 2) As mentioned, an adaptation should show evidence 
of good design, such as signs of specialization, efficiency and so on; 3) be evoked by 
appropriate triggers (reliably elicited by the circumstances it evolved to solve); and 4) fitness 
is reduced when the trait is lacking. An example of this point is incongenital sensitivity to 
pain—a rare condition where individuals are born with an inability to experience physical 
pain (see Pinsky & DiGeorge, 1966; Rosemberg, Nagahashi Marie, & Kliemann, 1994), 
which is likely caused by mutations (Indo et al., 1996; Mardy et al., 1999), sufferers of this 
condition often have unusual self-inflicted damage to their bodies (Protheroe, 1991). Indeed, 
Nesse (1999) has suggested that one way evolutionary hypotheses on the function of low 
mood can be tested (and this principle surely applies to the adaptationist hypotheses on major 
depression too) is too “find people who lack a capacity for low mood and identify the 
disadvantages they experience” (p. 262).  
Evolutionary medicine and evolutionary psychopathology 
Medicine benefits hugely from physiology and biochemistry, which studies how 
organs work and what they normally do. However, most medical research has studied 
proximate factors only (Williams & Nesse, 1991). This may be because disease is necessarily 
understood as abnormal, and to study them from an evolutionary perspective might seem 
preposterous (Nesse & Williams, 1996). However, the ultimate perspective in medicine does 
not study the evolution of the disease itself, but the design characteristics that make humans 
vulnerable to disease (Nesse & Williams, 1996). Natural selection, importantly, does not care 
about our happiness, it promotes health only when it is in the “interest” of our genes 
(Kurzban, 2012; Nesse & Williams, 1996). If tendencies for anxiety and physical pain (or, for 
that matter, heart disease and skin cancer) are associated with reproductive success it will be 
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selected for; if it is detrimental to reproductive success, it will strongly be selected against. 
An evolutionary perspective is necessary in order to not confuse defenses with disease 
states. For example, host defenses, such as cough and fever, are evolved defenses against 
disease-causing pathogens (Kluger, Kozak, Conn, Leon, & Soszynski, 1998; Nesse & 
Williams, 1996). The use of drugs that reduces the functioning of these adaptations (for 
example fever-reducing medicine during infections) can, therefore, be dangerous (Nesse & 
Williams, 1996). And, of course, the dysfunctioning of evolved defenses (inappropriately 
high fever for instance) can also be dangerous. A fine-tuned understanding of evolved 
function and dysfunction will therefore greatly inform clinical judgment when patients have 
fever. The task of explaining why humans are vulnerable to mental disorders, is not different, 
conceptually, from explaining why we are vulnerable to physical diseases (Nesse, 2009). The 
field of understanding mental disorder from an evolutionary perspective, has been called 
evolutionary psychopathology (Baron-Cohen, 1997a; Gilbert, 1998; Kennair, 2003).  
The complexities of brain mechanisms in its normal operation, is often hidden from 
sight (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992), leading to an “instinct blindness” (Cosmides & Tooby, 
1994a). For example children, given some environmental input, automatically acquire 
incredibly complex languages and speak them effortlessly (Pinker, 2003). The rare cascading 
failures of such biological complexity are often illuminating (Csete & Doyle, 2002), the 
failures of psychological mechanisms often reveal complexities of the mind that might else 
be taken for granted (e.g. autism Baron-Cohen, 1997b). 
Most clinicians would agree that sadness and grief can be normal responses, still 
much of the scientific literature assumes depression is an illness. And it is hard to blame 
anybody for it. As Nesse (2008, p. 525) put it:  
How can it possibly be helpful to feel hopeless, worthless, and lacking all motivation? 
In general, it is not. Much depression is a disease. However, depression is not a 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES ON WHY DEPRESSION EXIST  22 
 
disease like diabetes or cancer, it is more like chronic pain, a dysregulation of a 
response that can be useful in some situations. 
If this is true, what mechanisms have become dysregulated? Some instances of 
depression are undoubtedly disorders, and extremely unlikely to be an adaptation. For 
example a chronic major depression that seems to be unrelated to social and environmental 
circumstances (Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007). Where do we draw the line? Jerome Wakefield 
has attempted to answer this question. 
Harmful dysfunction. Natural selection shape mechanisms that work, so how can it 
help understand why the mind fails (Nesse, 2005)? To understand mental disorders, Jerome 
Wakefield (1992, 1999, 2005) has argued, it is necessary to understand dysfunction in light of 
evolved, normal biological function. The modules of the mind can fail, and this is sometimes 
harmful (Cosmides & Tooby, 1999)—if both of those criteria are meet, a condition would 
meet Wakefield’s criteria of a Harmful Dysfunction (HD), and hence can safely be called a 
“disease” (Wakefield, 1992, 1999, 2005, 2007). The first criteria, biological dysfunction, is 
simply mechanisms that do not properly perform its evolved function. To define a mental 
disorder, Wakefield argues, we also need to understand whether the condition is harmful, that 
is, a value judgment regarding the usefulness of the condition (or the suffering it maintains in 
individuals). Many dysfunctions can be harmless, or even desirable (especially in modern 
environments), and hence not a disorder. And, many traits can be functional but still harmful 
(e.g. jealousy), and hence not a disorder, in the HD sense (but might still prove to be a 
“treatable condition”) (Cosmides & Tooby, 1999). 
 Judgments regarding psychological normality and disorder, even before Darwin, was, 
in fact, judgments of evolutionary design. If the heart fails to pump blood, everybody agrees 
that it is dysfunctioning. Clinical psychology is not generally armed with these 
understandings of normally functioning cognitive architecture, which makes diagnostic 
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systems arbitrary (Nesse & Jackson, 2011; Nesse & Stein, 2012). Scientific progress, then, in 
our understanding of etiology, diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders may largely 
depend on progress in evolutionary psychology (Wakefield, 2005): The normal, cognitive 
architecture (functions) of the human mind must be understood before dysfunction can be 
properly understood.  
At this point, that is also the problem with the harmful dysfunction analysis: It 
depends on future mental health research, which will provide an evolutionary taxonomy on 
functions (Kennair, 2010). However, tests of evolutionary predictions on normal sadness will 
greatly inform our understanding of their dysfunctions (severe mood disorders). 
Mismatches. One important aspect from evolutionary medicine is the effect of 
mismatches. This happens when the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA)—the 
environment that provided the selection pressures for the adaptations in a species—is 
significantly different than the current environment. The EEA concept is very useful in 
evolutionary medicine in order to understand why there are so many “diseases of 
civilization”, like coronary heart disease, diabetes, obesity, asthma, allergies, and so on. One 
dramatic example is diet (see Cordain et al., 2000; Eaton, Eaton, Konner, & Shostak, 1996). 
The human digestive system evolved (like most human adaptations), in a hunter-gatherer 
context in the pleistocene. Human diets have diverged radically after the first agricultural 
revolution (~10000 years ago) and industrial revolution (~250 years ago), which have led to a 
mismatch between the foods the human digestive system evolved to process, and many 
current foods, creating an array of human health problems (Cordain et al., 2005; Durant, 
2013; Daniel Lieberman, 2013). For example, the high availability of vegetable (seed) oils 
rich in omega-6 polyunsaturated fatty acids (which has been cheap and easy to produce after 
the industrial revolution), leads to an abnormally high—for humans—omega6/omega3 ratio, 
which are involved in the pathogenesis of cardiovascular disease, cancer and inflammatory 
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and autoimmune diseases (Simopoulos, 2002).    
Some argue that depression, too, is a disease of modernity (Hidaka, 2012), caused by 
evolutionary mismatches, in not only diet—such as modern omega3 deficiencies (see Chilton 
et al., 2011; Lin & Su, 2007)—but many other arenas such as sleep and sunlight deficiency, 
sedentary lifestyles, loneliness and social inequality (for a discussion on these factors, see 
Hidaka, 2012). If the mismatch hypothesis of depression is true, we would expect increases in 
depression as societies are industrialized, (or “westernized”, “modernized”), There is 
evidence that depression is recently increasing in incidence (Compton, Conway, Stinson, & 
Grant, 2006), but this issue is unsettled, overdiagnosis and other factors might contribute to 
this trend (Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007). Ilardi (2009) has developed a treatment, based on 
evolutionary mismatch ideas, which attempts to change life-style factors (healthy diet, 
sufficient sleep, social activities and so on) in depressives. This approach might prove 
promising. 
However, mismatch need no imply that disorders have increased, it can also mean 
that normally functioning adaptations are activated to a higher degree. So if we propose that 
depression is caused, for example, by social alienation in modern societies, it could simply 
explain the upsurge of normally functioning sadness-mechanisms, not an upsurge of brain 
disorders (Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007). Although the mismatch hypothesis is highly relevant 
for understanding proximate causes, and treatments for depression—for example, if it is true, 
we would expect that hunter-gatherers (or people with an EEA-similar diet and activity level) 
rarely experience MDD—it is relatively agnostic on ultimate function: It reveals, and predict 
nothing on why sadness and/or depression exist in the first place.  
Adaptive Theories 
Social Competition Hypothesis and Rank Theory 
The social competition hypothesis (also called rank theory), first postulated by John 
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Price (1967) and later by several authors (Gilbert, 1992; Price, Sloman, Gardner, Gilbert, & 
Rohde, 1994; Sloman, 2000) postulate that depression is an unconscious and involuntary 
subordinate strategy in social competition. Depression, it is argued, is an adaptation that is 
activated whenever one is losing rank. Price developed this hypothesis because he noticed 
similarities between depressed patients and animals who lose in hierarchical encounters 
(Sloman, 2000). Indeed, Price (1967) argues that hierarchical struggles in groups requires 
certain behavior patterns from their members: Irritability towards inferiors, anxiety towards 
superiors (see prediction 1.1), elation on going up hierarchy and depression on going down 
(prediction 1.2). Expanding on this, Price et al (1994) hypothesized that mammalian 
depression executes an evolutionary function by activating specific psycho-biological 
response patterns that mediate the behavioral variation observed after losing or winning at 
social competition. In Gilbert’s (2000, p. 149) words: “The potential for involuntary, 
subordinate self-appraisal and its co-assembled affects and behaviors, evolved (perhaps) 
precisely to inhibit an animal from challenging for breeding resources in situations that it 
could not win”. The social competition hypothesis, then, predicts that depression is a ritual 
losing behavior which produces psychological incapacity (low self-esteem) that signals 
submission to the winner, but preserves the loser without physical damage. 
Many social animals have evolved complex hierarchical rank systems (Sapolsky, 
2005; Watts, 2002). Indeed, the mammalian selection pressures that gave rise to the “three 
peaks” of extremely large brains, namely toothed wales, humans and elephants, were mutual 
dependency based on external threats from predators and conspecific (same-species) groups 
(Connor, 2007). Social dependency and complexity produce a large neocortex (Dunbar, 1993, 
1998, 2007). Rank-sensitive neural circuitry’s in social mammals (chimpanzees, macaques, 
baboons, lions, dolphins, birds and many others) estimate relative rank amongst their group, 
and responds accordingly (e.g. Raleigh, McGuire, Brammer, Pollack, & Yuwiler, 1991). It is 
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likely, therefore, that the human brain is equipped with phylogenetically ancient rank-
mechanisms (see Barrett, 2012), maybe dating back to the common ancestors of humans and 
reptiles 250 million years ago (Price, 2000). For humans in particular, we have both 
cooperated (Axelrod, 2006; Cosmides & Tooby, 2005) and predated each other (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1988), which is likely to have provided important selection pressures for the 
evolution of particularly sensitive rank-systems. Successful orientation in the complex rank-
relations of human cultures are no easy task, particularly when descending the hierarchical 
ladder, which often entails aggression from superiors (Price & Sloman, 1987; Sloman & 
Gilbert, 2000).  
In the conflicts that arise when animals compete for important resources such as food, 
territory and sexual opportunity, organisms face the choice of either employing escalating 
strategies, that is, trying harder and use more aggressive tactics, or de-escalate, meaning 
going for damage limitation, retreating or giving up (Gilbert, 1992; Sloman, 2000). These 
strategies are called hawk and dove strategies, respectively. A dove strategy enables an 
organism to avoid getting into, or prolonging, a struggle one will lose. Whereas a hawk 
strategy facilitates better access to resources. Employing the right strategies can be complex, 
and have far-reaching consequences (Sloman, 2000). In social competition, an animal’s 
strategy is based on the Resource-holding potential (RHP), this variable holds, and expresses, 
an animal’s knowledge of its own fighting capacity, based on size, strength, skill, previous 
success, weapons and allies. Amongst humans, the SCH views the RHP as the equivalent of 
self-esteem. Thus, the RHP’s relative value allows an organism to either execute an 
escalating (hawk) or de-escalating (dove) strategy in agonistic (fighting) encounters. When 
the RHP is low, a contestant is more likely to yield (flee or submit) rather than to attack 
(Price et al, 1994).   
Maynard Smith’s (1982) evolutionary game theories shed light on the evolution of 
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dove and hawk strategies. These “games” mimic the evolutionary process by having 
computer-simulated strategies repeatedly compete against each other. Over time, the 
differential effectiveness of the strategies are reflected in their prevalence in the population of 
competing strategies. That is, their ‘fitness’. Maynard Smith and Price (1973) showed that 
pure hawk strategies were not “evolutionary stable”, a pure hawk strategy can only be 
effective in low numbers (negative frequency-dependent selection), mixed hawk/dove 
strategies, however, infiltrates such populations and stabilizes.     
Smith’s theoretical games suggest that it is not unlikely, in principle, that natural 
selection could favor “limited war” tactics, rather than, tactics of uninhibited aggression. 
Depression might be an evolved dove strategy meant for losses in agonistic encounters. 
However, this has not been tested empirically on humans. It is not clear either, in clinical 
terms, if it can account for both mild, and more severe depressive states. Even so, if 
depression is a “limited-war” tactic, is it a strategy that is activated in all humans under the 
right circumstances, or is it an evolved strategy that is maintained in only some humans? 
Depression, then, from the SCH perspective, is viewed as the human version of a 
dove strategy, or an Involuntary Subordinate Strategy (ISS). The ISS is hypothesized by 
Price (1994) to have three main functions. Firstly, it holds an executive function by inhibiting 
aggressive behavior from rivals and superiors (but not towards dependents) (prediction 1.4b 
and 1.1) and, in addition, creating a subjective sense of incapacity. Secondly, Price and his 
colleges (1994, p. 309) writes that the ISS holds a “communicative function that signals ‘no 
threat’ to rivals and ‘out of action’ to any kin or supporters who might wish to push the 
individual back into the arena to fight on their behalf” (prediction 1.4a), a “go-down stay put” 
program (Gilbert, 1992). The final function, Price and his colleges argue (1994), is 
facilitative, meaning that it encourages acceptance, and yielding behavior that signals 
acceptance of the outcome of competitive struggles (”I lost—I am harmless”). This final 
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stage leads to reconciliation and the termination of the conflict that triggered the ISS. If the 
involuntary yielding behavior (the depression) is “blocked” in a particular situation, the ISS 
may become intense and prolonged and thus be recognized as depressive disorder (Gilbert, 
2000; Gilbert & Allan, 1998) (see prediction 1.4a-d). This last point is a common view in the 
later writings from SCH theoreticians (e.g. Gilbert, 1998, 2000; Gilbert & Allan, 1998; 
Sloman, Farvolden, Gilbert, & Price, 2006). They suggest more of a “dysregulation” view: 
Major depression is a dysregulated form of adaptive “escape” behaviors from conflict. If the 
conflict is not resolved, it turns into a disorder. As Sloman, Farvolden, Gilbert and Price 
(2006, p. 97) argue: “when there is a failure of reconciliation, or when flight is not possible, 
the mechanisms associated with low positive affect or high negative affect may go into 
overdrive and become maladaptive by operating at a greater intensity and/or over a prolonged 
period of time.” 
Nevertheless, it is somewhat unclear whether the SCH attempts to explain the 
continuity from low mood to reactive major depressive disorders. Hence, tests of of the 
SCH’s on both normal “low-mood”, as well as clinical populations will illuminate this. For 
example, is low-mood an effective communicator of “I am out of action”, or “I yield”, while, 
major depression—which is known to cause interpersonal problems (see Segrin & Abramson, 
1994)—is not?  
Can loss of social status explain human depression? 
The RHP concept in the SCH involves social comparison processes. It is well-known 
that humans compare themselves with other members of their group (e.g. Festinger, 1954). If 
an individual perceive its RHP (self-esteem) as high relative to others, either due to cues from 
the environment or manipulation by drugs, that person might challenge and defend resources 
(act as a high-status individual, and hence not be depressed). The SCH, thus, might be able to 
explain why social inequality (see Pickett & Wilkinson, 2010) and low socioeconomic status 
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is related to depression (see Everson, Maty, Lynch, & Kaplan, 2002; Lorant et al., 2003): 
Perceptions of one’s own subordination in society maintains the depression. However, if the 
SCH is true, it would mean that inequality cause depression in anyone, not that depression 
cause low income. Attempts to entangle the causal directions of this association will probably 
prove revealing.    
Because many of the writers in the SCH-camp propose that subordination strategies 
may be phylogenetically ancient, ethological and cross-species (comparative) research is 
appropriate. This might shed valuable light on the evolutionary origins of sad mood and 
depression. However, this focus might also be its weakness: Have human rank-mechanisms 
and depressive behaviors remained unchanged since its phylogenetic origin? The SCH does 
not account for the social complexities of depression: Why, for instance, would losses of 
loved ones induce depression? Does that involve rank-loss? One possible answer is that 
social losses have, for humans and other primates, entailed the loss of an ally (Hagen, 2011). 
But, it is unclear why depression would, evolutionary speaking, “help” in this scenario. 
Another weakness, both functionally and dysfunctionally, is suicide. As Hagen (2011, p. 718) 
asked “why would submission to dominants, which protects a person from harm, be 
associated with killing oneself?”. There are other things which are left unclear by the SCH: 
How do humans calculate their social roles in groups? Which proximate factors are predicted 
to activate depressive states in humans (marriages, siblings, parents, work, societal factors)? 
If the SCH is true, depression is indeed the best strategy when descending the hierarchical 
ladder: Depression works, It actually inhibits aggression from high-ranking humans, at least 
in EEA-similar environments (prediction 1.7). And conversely, if the SCH is true, manic, 
high-self esteem strategies, (or neutral mood) is not. This must be explored empirically. 
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Behavioral Shutdown Mechanism, Disengagement from Incentives and Resource-
conservation  
Henriques has postulated an adaptationist hypothesis called “behavioral shutdown 
mechanism” (BSM). Meaning that an individual should decrease its “behavioral expenditure 
in response to chronic danger, stress or consistent failure to achieve one’s goals” (Henriques, 
2000). This is similar to Klinger’s (1975) analysis where depression is viewed as 
“disengagement from incentives”—the ultimate function of depression is to disengage from 
unobtainable goals in order to conserve resources. Nesse (2000) has expressed similar ideas. 
These models share aspects with the Social Competition Hypothesis, and they are included in 
the Social Risk Hypothesis (discussed in detail later). However, the disengagement and BSM 
views predict, uniquely, that depression should be activated when an individual is unable to 
disengage from an unreachable goal (prediction 2.1). And that depression should be frequent 
in people who are “anxious, duty-bound, ambitious or lacking alternatives because such 
individuals are especially likely to get themselves into situations in which they are unable to 
give up a major goal” (Nesse, 2000, p. 18) (prediction 2.2).    
The Third Ventricle Hypothesis 
Colin Hendrie and Alasdair Pickles (Hendrie & Pickles, 2010) argue that depression 
is an adaptation that ensures group membership, and reduces aggression, when social status is 
lowered. Hence, they posit the same ultimate functions as the SCH. However, they note that 
many brain mechanisms involved in producing the behavioral cluster of depression are 
bordering the third ventricle in the brain. For example, the pineal is involved in sleep/wake 
cycles; the hypothalamus in food and sex behaviors; and the amygdala in social affiliation 
and fear and defensive behaviors, whose main output, the stria terminalis, they note, pass 
through the third ventricle (Hendrie & Pickles, 2010). Based on these observations, Hendrie 
and Pickels (2010) postulate a proximate mechanism: Depression is produced by the release 
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of a toxin or toxins (e.g. cytokines) into the third ventricle, or, alternatively, by the inhibition 
of suppresion of toxins already present in the cerebrospinal fluid (prediction 3.2). They also 
predict that the toxin is likely to damage many cells (particularly glia cells, because they 
constitute 90% of the human brain) bordering the third ventricle that are unrelated to 
depressive behavior (prediction 3.2).  
The Third Ventricle Hypothesis can potentially explain findings in postmortem 
studies of depressives, such as the volume-reductions, in the mammilary bodies and fornix 
(Bernstein et al., 2012) and in the external pallidum in major depressives (Bielau et al., 2005). 
It can also explain the finding that some major depressives had reduced sizes of the amygdala 
in MRI scans (Sheline, Gado, & Price, 1998). However, both structural and blood-flow 
abnormalities have been observed in the frontal lobes of depressives (Drevets, 2000; Soares 
& Mann, 1997), which is left unexplained by the Hendrie and Pickels. 
Analytical Rumination Hypothesis 
Analytical Rumination Hypothesis (ARH) postulates that depression is an adaptation 
that is designed to solve complex fitness-relevant problems and maintain attention on those 
problems. This idea was originally included in Watson and Andrews (Watson & Andrews, 
2002) Social Navigation Hypothesis (which is a combination of the ARH and Bargaining 
theory). Here, I will discuss the ARH as later described by Andrews and Thomson (2009). 
They structure the postulations of the ARH by four main claims: 1) complex problems trigger 
depressed affect, 2) depression coordinates changes in body systems that promotes sustained 
analysis of the triggering problem, 3) depressive rumination helps people solve the triggering 
problem, and 4) depression reduces performance on laboratory tasks because depressive 
rumination takes up limited processing resources. 
First claim: Complex problems trigger depressed affect. Because the ARH 
postulates that depressive rumination evolved to effectively solve problems, Andrews and 
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Thomson (2009) expect that the treatment of depressive symptoms, rather than the triggering 
problem, should be ineffective in the long-term (see prediction 4.1a and b). Indeed, evidence 
suggests that antidepressant medications often fail to prevent relapse once the treatment 
stops, especially if the medication is discontinued before 6 months (Hollon, Thase, & 
Markowitz, 2002). Indeed, Andrews and colleges (2012) have argued elsewhere that 
antidepressants do more harm than good because antidepressants have adverse effects on 
bodily systems which are regulated by serotonin. According to the ARH, problem solving 
therapies like Interpersonal Therapy (IPT) and Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy (CBT), should 
be more effective relapse preventer's, because patients learn to solve interpersonal problems 
(which Andrews and Thomson suggests depression evolved to do). Tentatively, as predicted 
by the AR hypothesis, CBT and IPT do indeed have lower relapse-rates compared to 
antidepressants (Hollon et al., 2002). The ARH generates more testable predictions on 
treatment: Psychotherapies focusing on identification and solutions of social problems in the 
depressives life, should be more effective, than depression-therapies that do not (prediction 
4.2a, b and 4.3). Removing the depression symptoms without solving the underlying 
problem, Andrew and Thomson (2009) argue, would be like “curing” infection with aspirin: 
It removes the fever, but not the infectious agents (see Nesse & Williams, 1996). Andrew and 
Thomson (2009) therefore predict that a therapeutic focus on changing cognitions are 
ineffective (prediction 4.1a & 4.2a). They support this claim by pointing our attention to a 
study by Castonguay and colleges (1996). Here a positive correlation was found between 
depressive symptoms after treatment and CBT therapists focus on the link between distorted 
thoughts and negative emotions. Andrews and Thomson (2009) raise the possibility that this 
correlation exists “because patients could perceive CBT as dismissive of their real troubles” 
(2009, p. 626). Thus, Andrews and Thomson (2009) suggests that the behavioral activation 
component is more effective, compared to the automatic thoughts component, in CBT. 
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Indeed, they point to one study which found that chronic, severely depressed patients 
responded better to behavioral-activation therapy, than CBT (Coffman, Martell, Dimidjian, 
Gallop, & Hollon, 2007). From an ARH perspective this finding makes sense because 
behavioral-activation might facilitate real-life problem-solving rather than alteration of, or 
distraction from, rumination. However, it is not known whether severely depressed patients 
automatically engage in active problem-solving when they are encouraged to do behavioral 
activation. Clearly, behavior activation is not problem-solving. Furthermore, Wells (2009) 
found that, using Metacognitive therapy—which enables patients to actively interrupt 
rumination—was effective in treating four patients with chronic, major depression after 6 
month follow-up. Although the sample was small, this result opposes the idea that 
encouragement of the depressive’s rumination is necessary to terminate the depression. 
Interpersonal therapy focuses on strategies for solving social problems, and Andrews 
and Thomson (2009) mention one study that suggest that IPT, like Behavioral activation, 
might be more effective than CBT (see Cuijpers, van Straten, Andersson, & van Oppen, 
2008). Further, Andrews and Thomson (2009) claim that the reason why therapies such as 
CBT and IPT are effective treatments of depression is because they have a common feature 
of solving the problems which depressives face. Problem-solving therapy (PST) is an 
effective treatment of depression and suicide potential (Eskin, Ertekin, & Demir, 2008). A 
meta-analysis concluded that PST was significantly more effective than “treatment as usual”, 
and attention placebos, but not more effective compared to other bona fide treatments 
presented specifically in other studies (Malouff, Thorsteinsson, & Schutte, 2007). Watson 
(2008) hypothesize that the reason why PST treatments are not remarkably more effective 
than other treatments is because standard PST focuses on general, rational problem-solving 
skills: “Standard PST does not offer a concentrated effort to identify specific social barriers to 
major fitness-enhancing revisions of the patients socioeconomic niche, that is, the socially 
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cause fitness-hindrances that the SNH proposes to be the main context for adaptive major 
depression”. A new problem-solving therapy, based on the SNH, then, should be more 
effective in treating depression. Wampold and his colleges (1997), in a meta-analysis, found 
that cognitive therapy was more effective than non-bona fide treatments (therapies not based 
on principles in psychological science, nor given by a professional), but not more effective 
than other bona fide treatments. This is contrary to what is expected from the ARH because 
cognitive therapy, which contain at least some problem-solving ingredients, are expected to 
be more efficient than therapies that do not. Nevertheless, the ARH/SNH provides a rich 
source of predictions on clinical effectiveness which are in need of testing (see predictions 
4.1, 4.2 & 4.3).  
To elaborate on the assertion that “complex problems trigger depressed affect”, 
Andrews and Thomson (2009) point to the content of depressed people’s thoughts. 
Depressives often report that they face severe complex problems that are difficult to solve. 
Further, depressives report little confidence in solving those problems, and, also, that they 
focus more than before on their problems (Andrews & Thomson, 2009; Lyubomirsky, 
Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 1999). Indeed, the content of thoughts; the inner melancholic 
voices, what depressives ruminate on, is an important, interesting, even radical aspects of the 
ARH: Depressive thoughts are not pathological, irrelevant side-effects of a disease of the 
mind, they are a cognitive call-to-arms for finding solutions to fitness-relevant social 
problems. See prediction 4.4. It should be noticed, however, that Lyubomirsky et al (1999) 
found that ruminating depressives were less willing to solve their problems, both personal 
and hypothetical. This appears in contrast to what we would expect if the ARH was true. 
Lyubomirsky (1999) raise the possibility that depressives are attempting to solve their 
personal problems, which can explain the poor hypothetical problem-solving. However, 
rumination has also been described as a vicious-cycle which prolongs, even worsens the 
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depression, and that people who ruminate when they experience depression, might get worse 
than people who distract themselves (e.g. seeNolen-Hoeksema, 1991). This seems to contrast 
with the ARH. It might also contradict with the ARH that several treatments for depression, 
like cognitive therapies, especially metacognitive therapy, which terminates rumination, or 
teaches the uselessness of it, can be effective. However, Watson (personal communication) 
points out that the rumination alone might not terminate the depression—only perceived 
solutions to the fitness-relevant problem, which rumination is not guaranteed to find, is 
hypothesized to terminate depression (see the bargaining section). Tests of the treatment-
predictions (prediction 4.1-4.3), should control for this effect.       
To test whether depression evolved to solve complex problems, we must ask what 
makes a social problem complex. And, Andrews and Thomson (2009) claim that the 
complexity of a social problem is dependent on the number of people involved. They call 
such problems fitness-relevant dilemmas. They argue that a human worrying about a social 
dilemma cannot a priori know what strategy is effective to pursue. Especially when the 
number of people involved is high, because then the number of viable strategies also increase 
(which makes the problem complex. See point 1 in prediction 4.5). This is not obvious. 
Heuristic solutions to many complex problems can, and have, evolved. For example, male 
humans seek out reliable cues to fertility, youth and health, such as low ratio in hips to waist, 
symmetrical face, clear skin and so on (see Buss, 1989, 1994a, 1994b; Singh, 1993; Symons, 
1979). Nevertheless, Andrews and Thomson (2009) argue that all the potential solutions to 
social dilemmas are non-obvious and tend to differ in their effectiveness. Hence, they argue 
that it is worth the time and cost to figure out which strategy to pursue, rather than using 
heuristics.  
Andrews and Thomson view findings such as the 25-fold increased risk of major 
depression when unhappily married (Weissman, 1987) and that conflict with close social 
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partners (e.g. closer friends) is associated with higher levels of depression if the relationships 
otherwise are characterized by cooperation (Major, Zubek, Cooper, Cozzarelli, & Richards, 
1997) as good evidence that conflicts within cooperative relationships are depressogenic. It 
can be predicted from the ARH, then, that the number, and closeness, of people involved in a 
problem are part of what determines the intensity of depressive episodes (see point 2 in 
prediction 4.5). 
Another important part of the first claim is that depression prevents recurrences of 
avoidable stressors. As some social problems are avoidable, organisms are under selection to 
prevent them from happening (Andrews and Thomson, 2009). One reason why avoidable 
stressors happen to humans is a lack of causal understanding of the situation (Roese & Olson, 
1997). Mechanisms of operant conditioning associates, for many organisms, negative 
outcomes with recurrent environmental stimuli. This allows the organism to avoid these 
negative events in the future. Similarly, people may, when exposed to avoidable stressors, 
devote some cognitive effort to understand how the unfortunate event can be avoided in the 
future (Andrew and Thomson, 2009). Such thoughts, Andrew and Thomson (2009) remind 
us, are called upward counterfactual thoughts (see Roese & Olson, 1997). These thoughts are 
counterfactual in the sense that they attempt to simulate “how could my situation turn out 
differently if I chose a different course of action”. They are also upward counterfactual 
thoughts because they tend to focus on how to make the situation turn out better next time. 
Avoidable stressors tend to induce negative affect, which in turn trigger upward 
counterfactual thoughts. Depressives tend to have more upward counterfactual thoughts about 
recent avoidable stressors (Markman & Weary, 1996). Andrews and Thomson (2009) cite 
three different studies (Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Page & Colby, 2003; Roese, 1994), and the 
common finding among those studies is that upward counterfactual thinking may help 
prevent avoidable stressors repeating themselves. Nasco and Marsh (1999) found that 
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students’ upward counterfactual thoughts were associated with higher perceptions of control 
in students. This, subsequently, led to better grades. Such studies suggest that counterfactuals 
might, at least in some cases, be useful. But, did depression (or low-mood) evolve to activate 
counterfactuals in specific situations? Testing needs to be done in the AR context: Do upward 
counterfactual thoughts in depressives, in fact, enhance efficient problem-solving of complex 
fitness-relevant social dilemmas (see prediction 4.6a and b)?  
Andrews and Thomson (2009, p. 628) provide a prediction: “experimentally 
manipulating the analytical difficulty of the dilemma by changing the degree to which trade-
offs must be made between cooperating and pursuing self-interest, by changing the number of 
people to keep track of, and so on, will induce depressed affect”  (prediction 4.9). Andrews 
(2007) performed an experiment testing some of these ideas. Their participants were asked to 
solve questions from the Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM) (Raven, Court, & 
Raven, 2003) test (a nonverbal IQ test). Their prediction was that these analytically 
challenging problems would induce depressed affect in individuals with low levels of pre-
existing depression. Their prediction was supported. This suggests that depressed affect is 
induced whenever there is a complex task at hand (prediction 4.8b), and that sadness is 
induced in people exposed to an analytically challenging problem (prediction 4.8a). Andrews 
et al (2007) also found that the depressive reactions of their subjects were positively related 
to their performance.  
Andrews et al. (2007) study above suggests that depressed affect is induced in 
humans, with no pre-existing depression, when simply exposed to a complex problem, such 
as the RAPM IQ test. And, that it actually enhances the performance on it. However, The AR 
hypothesis claims that depression evolved to solve fitness-relevant problems, not modern IQ 
tests. It remains to be tested then, if this effect is stronger for interpersonal problems (see 
prediction 4.5, 4.6 and 4.9). It is important to test too, whether clinically depressed 
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individuals solve complex social-dilemmas differently than individuals with experimentally 
induced sadness. According to the ARH, sadness-intensity will positively correlate with 
performance. The more sadness the better. In general, the studies Andrews and Thomson 
discuss, are on non-clinical populations. Sad college students, mostly. Hence, researchers 
attempting to falsify these hypotheses on clinical populations will shed a bright light on 
depression’s status as a problem-solving adaptation. The sadness-inducing experiments 
however, are useful because they seem to suggest that normal levels of sadness evolved to 
solve complex problems. The ARH, and SNH, of course, postulate that even MDD can be an 
adaptive problem-solving strategy; it is the response to the most complex problems. This begs 
for testing. 
Second claim: Depression coordinates changes in body systems that promote 
sustained analysis of the triggering problem. Andrews and Thomson (2009) suggest that 
depression changes cognition and bodily functions in order to hinder diversion from the time-
consuming analytical rumination. These hindrances are threefold 1) depressed affect activates 
neurological mechanisms responsible for attentional control, which gives problem-related 
information prioritized access to limited cognitive resources, and keeps the ruminations 
intrusive and resistant to distraction (Andrews & Thomson, 2009). 2) Anhedonia, which 
reduces the desire to engage in activities that disrupt problem-related processing. 3) 
Psychomotor retardation, which hinders exposure to stimuli that disrupt processing. 
Andrews and Thomson (2009) argue that analysis of a complex problem requires the 
use of working memory (WM) because analytical problems are predicted to be broken down 
into smaller parts, and studied sequentially, hence the results of the analysis must be kept 
active in WM in order to solve the larger problem (see prediction 4.10) (Andrews & 
Thomson, 2009). When WM load is high, such as when analyzing complex social problems, 
the WM tasks become vulnerable to disruption. This is another reason why, from the AR 
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perspective, depression evolved. Finding cost-effective solutions to reproductively relevant 
social problems (e.g. group membership, access to resources) are vital for a social mammal 
like a human. Hence, depression evolved to make nothing but the social problem linger in the 
mind. It makes sense, from the ARH perspective, if depressives with a high WM-functioning 
solve analytical social problems faster. And thus they will experience less depression 
compared to individuals who have a low WM-function, and solve social problems less 
effectively (prediction 4.10).  
The left Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex (VLPFC) is continually activated when fMRI 
subjects solve analytical tasks (Andrews & Thomson, 2009; D'Esposito, Postle, & Rypma, 
2000). Andrews and Thomson (2009) include other neuroimaging studies which found that 
individuals with experimentally induced sadness, and outpatients with major depression 
episodes, usually have highly activated VLPFCs (Drevets, 1999; George et al., 1995), 
especially in the left hemisphere. Andrews and Thomson (2009) suggest, then, that brain 
areas that play a role in attentional vigilance are more activated in sad people and depressives 
than in non-depressed controls. Maybe, they point out, because activation of VLPFC is 
necessary to avoid distraction from fitness-relevant problems. However, neural correlates of 
attention in depressives brain, is not necessarily evidence for adaptation, but the ARH 
produces novel hypotheses here. 
Andrews and Thomson (2009) claim that “Behavioral depression” in rodents cause 
sustained release of serotonin in the rodent homologue of the VLPFC. They therefore predict 
that brain 5-HT (serotonin) in those regions is high, not low, in depressed humans (prediction 
4.11b). However, see Hendrie and Pickels (2009) critique of using rodents as a model-species 
for depression, they argue that the social selection pressures in most rodents evolutionary 
history are too different to be applicable to humans (2009). Anyhow, Andrews and Thomson 
(2009) predict that the VLPFC level of activation correlates with the severity of a patients 
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depressive episode (prediction 4.11c). They also predict that the “sustained release of 5-HT to 
the VLPFC should promote the production of astrocytic lactate, sustain neuronal firing, and 
reduce apoptosis by supporting the clearance of synaptic glutamate”. The logic behind this 
prediction is that if the VLPFC is continually activated in depressed individuals, many of 
these cortical neurons will release glutamate. And, a high level of glutamate in the synapse is 
toxic because it induces apoptosis (cell suicide) in the neurons. So if it is true that sustained 
activation of the VLPFC is necessary to prevent disruption of analytical rumination, it should 
come with the risk of apoptosis. However, serotonin often acts as a modulator on glutamate 
(see Ciranna, 2006), which is why Andrews and Thomson predict that an increase in 
serotonin in depression has evolved to decrease the risk of apostosis. Further, astrocytes take 
up glutamate from the synapse and convert it to glutamine (cellular energy), which is stored 
in the neuron. Astrocytes (glial cells) also provide neurons lactate, which is also used for 
energy. Under continued neural firing, the energy-costs becomes acute. Thus, to continue 
firing, neurons rely on this astrocytic lactate as an energy source. This is relevant for the AR 
hypothesis because Andrews and Thomson predict that depressives have increased 
production of astrocytic lactate (prediction 4.11a). The sustained activation of the 
glutamergic neurons in depressives VLPFC makes this likely. Prediction-wise, it is useful to 
acknowledge that the ARH predicts that a depressed brain should, contrary to conventional 
understanding, be marked by an increase in serotonergic firing. And, be marked by increased 
production of astrocytic lactate in order to provide sufficient energy for continued firing of 
VLPFC neurons.  
This might also provide an explanation for the connection between depression and 
carbohydrate-cravings (see Wurtman & Wurtman, 1994, 1995). The essential aminoacid 
tryptophan constantly flows in the bloodstream, and is converted into serotonin in the brain. 
The insulin-secretion during intake of carbohydrates makes peripheral tissues, like muscles, 
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take up most aminoacids in the bloodstream. Trypthopan is an exception, it is not affected by 
insulin. Hence, during intake of carbohydrates, tryptophan has less competition in entering 
the blood-brain barrier (Wurtman & Wurtman, 1994). This makes sense in the AR 
perspective: Maybe depressives crave carbohydrates because it enhances the production of 
serotonin, which is necessary for the continued activation of attention systems such as the 
VLPFC (see prediction 4.11d). 
Anhedonia, the inability to experience pleasure, too, the ARH proposes, reduces 
disruption of depressive rumination. Attending to immediate rewards, such as sex, eating and 
companionship, would interfere with attempts to solve the social problems in the depressives 
life (Andrews and Thomson, 2009). Thus, “Anhedonia should promote uninterrupted 
rumination by reducing the motivation to engage in hedonic activites” (Andrews & Thomson, 
2009, p. 623). A relevant prediction then is that the degree to which a depressives are 
anhedonic, predicts the degree to which they have a focused and uninterrupted rumination, 
and hence solve a social problem faster (Prediction 4.12a and b). If this is true, we would 
expect that anhedonic patients that are treated with simple behavioral activation (with no 
problem solving), would experience longer, more intense depressive episodes. Given that a 
meta-analysis (Cuijpers, Van Straten, & Warmerdam, 2007) found that behavioral activation 
is effective for depression, this is a challenge to ARH. If the ARH is true, the efficacy of 
behavioral activation is due to enhanced problem-solving. Given that behavioral activation 
often consists of simple scheduling of pleasant activities (see Cuijpers et al., 2007), this is by 
no means evident.  
Andrews and Thomson (2009) also interpret the psychomotor changes that are 
typically seen in depressed patients as a disruption-avoidance strategy. Fatigue, changes in 
appetite and a preference for solitude, all contribute to sustained analysis of the triggering 
social problem by avoiding distracting stimuli (Andrews and Thomson, 2009). This generates 
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a similar prediction as for anhedonia: Psychomotor retardation is expected to be associated 
with more intense rumination (Andrews and Thomson, 2009, p. 632). The authors also argue 
that Anhedonia should be triggered, in a dose-dependent manner, by analytically difficult 
problems, especially those who are evolutionary relevant (Andrews and Thomson, 2009). See 
prediction 4.12a and b. 
Third claim: Depressive rumination helps people solve the triggering problem. 
Andrews and Thomson (2009) argue that future research should investigate how depressive 
cognition influences the triggering problem. They argue that this is best tested 
experimentally. Individuals with pre-existing depression might have different problems, in 
experiments, however, the analytical problems are carefully designed and equal to all 
participants. Induce groups with different affects (and their intensity), then see how they do 
when solving the same problems. Andrews and Thomson do not address it, but this has the 
same problem of assuming that sad mood is simply a continuous enhancer of social problem-
solving. That might not be true (see prediction 4.14a). Severe cases of sadness, which are 
hard and unethical to induce experimentally, might not enhance reasoning on social 
problems. Despite of Andrews and Thomson (2009) preference for experiments, another way 
of testing could be by interviewing people who have been depressed, but not anymore. What 
made them depressed, and did their depression in fact disappear after ruminating their way to 
a solution to their problem?  
Experimental studies seem to suggest that depressed (or, at least, normal “bad mood”) 
individuals indeed make better decisions. One example is Au et al (2003) who manipulated 
mood by asking participants to read mood-laden or neutral statements, and listening to either 
sad or upbeat music. Thereafter, the study participants were asked to participate in a trading-
market game. Traders in a good mood lost more money. People in a bad mood behaved more 
conservatively, had more accurate judgments, and hence profited the most. Pleasant mood 
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seemed to reduce peoples accuracy, while increasing confidence in their judgment (Au et al., 
2003). Other experiments have shown that depressed people are more sensitive to costs of 
cooperating than are nondepressed people, and they are more likely to defect when it is costly 
to cooperate (Hertel, Neuhof, Theuer, & Kerr, 2000). In other words, depressives tend to 
make more “rational” decisions in these circumstances (see prediction 4.14b). One can argue 
then that a “good-mood” strategy might be an ineffective strategy when trying to solve 
complex, high-risk and fitness-relevant, social problems. But this is clearly a premature 
conclusion. In the study by Hertel and colleges (2000) they found that positive mood 
promoted a heuristic processing style. Furthermore, they found that negative mood lead to 
longer decision latencies, which they interpreted as evidence for a deliberate cognitive style. 
This indeed lead sad participants to more economically rational decisions in the dilemma that 
they studied (chicken dilemma). However, depressive’s failure to make quick decisions can 
also be viewed as manifestation of an unadaptive illness, not an adaptation for solving 
complex problems in rational ways. People who are depressed might make “careful” 
decisions, not because of enhanced rationality, but because depressive illness lead people to 
stop making decisions. Future experiments must explore this. The notion that depressive 
thinking is rational thinking has been raised before (”depressive realism” see Alloy & 
Abramson, 1988). In a review of the evidence for depressive realism Ackermann and 
Derubeis (1991) write: “although many studies have generated evidence consistent with the 
depressive realism hypothesis, almost as many have provided evidence inconsistent with this 
view.” (p. 565). There is a danger then, that Andrews and Thomson (2009) discussion is 
biased by cherry-picking of compatible evidence. Even so, the experimental evidence 
mentioned (Au et al., 2003; Hertel et al., 2000) seem to suggest that sad people make more 
conservative, careful decisions. The question remains, as discussed earlier, if this is true for 
clinical depression, and especially major depressive disorder. Experiments on normal 
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populations insufficiently tests the ARH. Trials that compare neutral mood, experimentally 
induced sadness and patients diagnosed with mild depressive episode, and MDD, surely will 
illuminate how these states affect social problem-solving skills. Also, experimental studies 
could test whether there is a content-effect. Are there particular problems that sad participants 
and clinical depressives are better or worse at? Of course, the ARH predicts that depressives 
are better at solving problems that are interpersonal in nature. Given such a content-effect, is 
it dose-dependent, meaning more sadness, better social-problem solving? Or, perhaps, is the 
relationship an inversed-u-curve pattern, sadness being effective, but severe depression not? 
All are empirical questions, and the ARH predicts that the dose-dependent effect would be 
true (See prediction 4.14a). Another relevant prediction is this: if depressive rumination is 
helping to solve the triggering social problem, expressive writing should enhance long-term 
outcomes of psychotherapy (prediction 4.15). Andrews and Thomson (2009) cite a controlled 
study which supports this (see Graf, Gaudiano, & Geller, 2008).  
Fourth claim: Depression reduces performance on laboratory tasks because 
depressive rumination takes up limited processing resources. Andrews and Thomson 
(2009) interpret the evidence that depressed individuals perform badly on laboratory tasks 
(e.g Austin et al., 2001) in the following way: performance-decrements happen because 
depressives cognitive resources are allocated to something else, probably the depression-
triggering problem. They cite evidence that support their interpretation. When research 
participants are asked to read statements such as “I feel a little down today” (see Seibert & 
Ellis, 1991), it reduces their performance on laboratory tasks (Ellis, Ottaway, Varner, Becker, 
& Moore, 1997). The ARH therefore predicts that depressive rumination will interfere with 
performances on laboratory tasks. And that depressed individuals will perform just as well as 
nondepressed individuals if this rumination is temporarily stopped (prediction 4.16a & b). 
This prediction is supported by an experimental study (Watkins & Brown, 2002). Here, the 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES ON WHY DEPRESSION EXIST  45 
 
difference in outcome on a random number-generation task between depressed and 
nondepressed people were wiped out after both groups performed a distraction task (thinking 
about a black umbrella for five minutes). Suggesting that depressives apparent decrement in 
executive functioning might be due to other cognitive processes (rumination, problem-
solving) that use limited cognitive resources. As we have seen, the ARH claims that this is 
one thing depression evolved to do: hinder diversion from problem-solving rumination. This 
leads the ARH to an interesting set of predictions: Temporary alleviation of rumination will 
increase performance on laboratory tasks, but prolonged alleviation of rumination will 
increase the length of depressive episodes (See prediction 4.16, 4.1a and b). The fourth claim 
also receives support from a study by Andrews and colleges (2007). Here, their “magnet 
metaphor” was supported (prediction 4.16a): people with pre-existing depression experience 
a decrease in depressed affect when given a distracting task. In the absence of a distracting 
task however, their depressed affect increases. The steel ball (the depressive) must be pulled 
away from its magnetic source (their problem) in order to temporarily reduce the magnetic 
force (depressed affect).  
Social Motivation Function and Bargaining Hypothesis. 
In addition to the analytical rumination function, Social Navigation Hypothesis 
(Watson & Andrews, 2002) postulated a social motivation function: Depression is 
hypothesized to serve the function of persuading others to help the depressive (2002). Similar 
ideas have been expressed by Hagen (2003; Hagen, Watson, & Thomson) in his Bargaining 
Hypothesis (BH). Both theories attempt to account for depression in general. Hagen has also 
hypothesized about bargaining in relation to postpartum depression (this is discussed in the 
sex differences section). The idea of help-elicitation it also a part of Suarez and Gallup’s 
(1985) Reproductive Failure Theory and the Social Risk Hypothesis. The notion of 
depression as help-eliciting is therefore important to test, as they will throw light on several 
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evolutionary hypothesis for depression.  
The logic of Watson and Andrew’s (Watson & Andrews, 2002) social motivation 
function is twofold: The depressed state forces a fitness cost not only on the depressive 
herself, but to her relatives and other allies. It is an honest signal of need (this is based on the 
handicap principle, see Zahavi, 1975, 1977). Since the depression is honest it motivates 
others to help due to fitness extortion: it forces members of the depressives’ social network to 
make investments they would not otherwise make (Watson & Andrews, 2002). If the 
depressive state was easily manipulated, it would not be an honest signal, hence the very 
point of depression, the SNH and BH predict, would be to provide an enormous fitness cost 
on the depressive herself. People who are interested in the depressives fitness might do best 
by intervening, rather than ignoring or manipulating the depressive. A straightforward 
prediction, then, is that genuine (honest) help from significant others would relieve, or stop 
entirely, the depressive episode (prediction 5.1b). From this perspective, MDD is a form of 
manipulation, therefore the SNH predicts that depressives are met with negative reactions 
(prediction 5.2b). Furthermore, Hagen and Watson (2004) emphasize that MDD will be 
induced in individuals if that person has a need for social assistance and has strong conflicts 
with important social partners (prediction 5.2a). Negative life events in general, are not 
predicted to induce MDD (Hagen & Thomson, 2004). It is predicted, as with the ARH, that 
depressive symptoms are reduced to the degree the triggering problem is solved (prediction 
5.5).  
Watson and Andrews (2002) divide the fitness extortion in two motivation 
hypotheses. Depression is designed to either motivate whole networks, the “niche change” 
function of depression, or to motivate specific partners. This generates more predictions.  
Watson and Andrews (2002) define an individual’s social niche as the reciprocal 
exchange contracts they have with each person in their social network. “A person’s social 
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niche”, Watson and Andrews (2002) write, “may vastly under-utilize their capacities for 
maximizing inclusive fitness”. The authors go on to postulate that niche changes require 
assistance from people in their network (political favors, skill training, capital investment). If 
an individual motivated to change its social niche experiences drawbacks due to the 
expectations and attitudes of their group, this problem might best be solved by motivating the 
social network as a whole through severe depression (Watson and Andrews, 2002). Thus, the 
prediction is that depression should be designed to resist convictions of staying in the status 
quo, and, in fact “contingently worsen to a point where the costs imposed on the depressive’s 
social partners overwhelm their resistance to the bid for niche change”. It could be predicted 
then that the numbers of, and degree to which, a depressives family members and friends try 
to resists the depressives attempts of niche change (e.g. starting a new job or education, 
moving away from home) are positively related to the strength of the depressives symptoms, 
including suicide (Watson & Andrews, 2002) (prediction 5.3a and 5.7, respectively). If the 
niche-change idea is true, psychotherapy for depression should be effective if the therapist is 
sensitive to the opportunity costs the patients perceives (”I have much to gain by switching 
social niche”) and help the patient to develop an idiosyncratic plan for achieving the niche-
change, or alternatively, help the patient abandon the desire for niche-change (Watson, 
personal communication). In both of these cases the depression should be relieved (prediction 
5.3b). However, there are still no empirical tests of these ideas.   
It is also possible that depression is designed to motivate specific partners. Watson 
and Andrews (2002) suggest that this could be tested by “showing variation in 
symptomatology that preferentially imposes costs on those partners with whom the 
depressive is in conflict, and that the costs were imposed to overcome their reluctance to 
help”. In other words, the “specific partners” motivational hypothesis predicts that 
depressives symptoms will idiosyncratically correspond to motivate a specific significant 
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other (see prediction 5.4). Watson and Andrews (2002) point out that both motivational 
hypotheses predict that people should become more depressed when they are in conflict with 
partners who have a greater positive fitness interest in them, defined as people who have 
helped the depressive in the past (prediction 5.6a and b). Complimentary, Watson and 
Andrews (2002) propose an adaptive function for suicidal behavior (see prediction 5.7). 
Suicide has, albeit differently, been hypothesized  as adaptive before (as a kin-selected 
mechanism, see de Catanzaro, 1995). Under the SNH perspective, the risk of death is an 
honest signal which informs others of the severity of their need. The reason for the 
heightened risk of suicide after hospitalization (Bostwick & Pankratz, 2000), Watson and 
Andrews (2002) predict, is that such practices removes the depressive from their social 
group, and hence, failing to motivate the absent social partners, suicidal behaviors escalates 
into louder and louder signals, which ends in death (Watson & Andrews, 2002).      
Do the Analytical Rumination Hypothesis and the Bargaining Hypothesis Show 
Evidence of Design? 
The ARH views depression as a coordinator of bodily and cognitive systems which 
facilitates creative solutions to real-life, complex, fitness-relevant social problems. And, 
furthermore, the bargaining model and the social motivation function predict that depression 
evolved to elicit help from social partners. Nettle (2004) has critiqued adaptive hypothesis, 
but especially the Social Navigation Hypothesis, which consists of the Analytical Rumination 
and Bargaining Hypothesis. The reason for this is that they propose the boldest claim: Major 
depression can be adaptive. 
As I discussed in the introduction, adaptations must lack heritable variation; show 
evidence of good design; have appropriate evocation (Nettle, 2004), and; individuals who 
lack the adaptation (in, or close to, the ancestral environment), must, either by chance or 
experimental manipulation, have reduced fitness (Nettle, 2004). Since the SNH, and hence 
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the ARH, and the BH, postulate that depression, both minor or major, can be an adaptation, 
Nettle (2004) argues that “any individuals who lack the capacity to become depressed when 
there are appropriate cues in the environment should suffer reduced fitness”. And this is the 
core of Nettle’s (2004) criticism of the SNH (ARH and BH): some people are more at risk, 
due to genetic variance, for depression than others, which means that depression fails to make 
the criteria for an adaptation. Although environmental triggers have been shown to be 
important in depression, their effects seem to be moderated by genetic risk-factors (Caspi et 
al., 2003; Kendler, Karkowski, & Prescott, 1999; Kendler et al., 1995; Kessler, 1997). This 
supports a classical stress-diathesis view; genetic predispositions are activated by 
environmental triggers. In other words, and Nettle (2004) stress this point: There are many 
people who experience the life-stressors that depressives do, but do not become depressed, 
which suggests that depression is not a species-typical adaptation activated by appropriate 
environmental triggers (this point is discussed further under the mutation-selection part). 
Additionally, Nettle (2004) points out, the best predictor for depression is an earlier 
depressive episode, and as Varga (2012, p. 49) has remarked, while assuming, for thought-
experimentation, that depression solves complex problems (ARH):  
Knowing that every depressive episode dramatically increases the risk of another 
episode, this means that individuals facing complex problems are more likely to face 
such problems again. So even if it were true that depression is an adaptation to allow 
optimal functioning, it certainly does not seem to be effective.  
At the face of it, depression does not seem to solve the evolutionary problem which 
the SNH and the Bargaining Hypothesis predicts it to solve, which, of course, is a 
requirement for an adaptation: It must be shown to actually solve the problems it was 
designed to solve. If we predicted, and tested in a laboratory, that men are equipped with a 
psychological adaptation to solve the adaptive problem of identifying fertile mates, but the 
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men’s mate choices were found to be completely random and unrelated to fertility cues (such 
as a 0.7 waist-to-hip ratio), it would led us to strongly suspect that men do not have a 
psychological mechanism to solve this problem. This is the situation with depression too: 
There is no evidence—which may, of course, be due to lack of proper empirical testing—that 
depressives solve a set of adaptive problems better than non-depressives (especially in the 
clinical range). Indeed, Nettle (2004) argues that depression instead has “all the hallmarks of 
a progressively deteriorating and socially disastrous dysfunction of the central nervous 
system rather than an adaptation that has achieved its goal”.  
The Social Risk Hypothesis 
The Social Risk Hypothesis (SRH) postulates that depression evolved to minimize 
risk in social interaction. That is, to minimize the risk for group exclusion. Depression down-
regulates positive affect and confident engagement in the world because it evolved, in 
Badcock and Allen’s words (2011), to “facilitate a risk-aversive approach to social 
interactions in situations where individuals where typically at risk of exclusion from social 
contexts (dyadic relationships or groups) that were vital to dealing with adaptive, socio-
reproductive challenges” (p. 131). Altogether, Allen and Badcock (2003) postulate that 
depression serves the function of decreasing risk of exclusion by first being hypersensitive to 
signals of social threat from others, and, based on those perceptions, send signals that reduce 
risk and elicit care, and additionally, inhibit confident risk-seeking behavior. Social activities 
such as competition and cooperation with non-kin, are viewed as high-risk activities. 
Depression, then, from the SRH perspective, is a shift in an individual’s desire for 
competition and non-kin cooperation, which is viewed as high-variance and risky, to less 
risky care-elicitation from close, communal-type relations (Allen & Badcock, 2003) (see 
prediction 6.1). 
 Importantly, Allen and Badcock (2003) specify that their theory attempts to explain 
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“mild (and predominantly transient) depressive states of the type that are experienced by 
most persons from time to time” (p. 888), and they argue, as many others have (Gilbert, 1992; 
Hagen, 2011; Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007), that extreme states of depression, are best 
understood as pathologies.  
If the SRH is correct, mild and transient depressed mood preserves social 
relationships (prediction 6.4b), and also, reduces the risk that an individual will be socially 
excluded (Allen and Badcock, 2003) (prediction 6.4a). Another straightforward prediction 
from the SRH is that sad and mildly depressed individuals are more sensitive to social risk 
when such risks are present (prediction 6.3b). However, the reverse causal pattern is also 
plausible: heritable personality factors (Jang, Livesley, & Vemon, 1996) are associated with 
depression, for example neuroticism and interpersonal sensitivity (see Boyce & Mason, 
1996), this can also explain the interpersonal sensitivity of depressives. If the SRH is true, we 
would not expect that any normal human being will fail to be depressed, regardless of 
personality structure, given a history of problematic interpersonal encounters, such as 
exclusions, and certainly not during the exclusion process.  
Allen and Badcock (2003) intentions with the SRH, they write, is to analyze the 
“specific socially embedded selection pressures that would likely have led to the evolution of 
depressed states—that is, the avoidance of social exclusion by controlling the balance 
between an individual’s social value to others and his or her social burden on others” (p. 
887). Here, the social value refers to resources: If an individual is considered to be low in 
resources, or burdensome, it might be advantageous for the other members of the group to 
exclude that individual (Allen & Badcock, 2003). The ratio then, between resources that an 
individual provides to its group (social value) and the cost to others (social burden), is 
critical. In order to avoid social exclusion, Allen and Badcock (2003) propose an evolved 
mechanism by which an individual can judge its own social value. They call it social 
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investment potential (SIP)—this is the calculated ratio between social burden and value—and 
phenomenologically the SIP is experienced as low self-esteem (Allen & Badcock, 2003). 
This mechanism enables a human being to internally measure their social value, such as 
attractiveness, talents, skills and resources, relative to others (Allen & Badcock, 2003). This 
is similar to Leary’s “sociometer” theory, where self-esteem is linked to social exclusion 
(Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary, Schreindorfer, & Haupt, 1995; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & 
Downs, 1995), however, Allen and Badcock (2003) argue that the SIP is a mechanism that is 
directly relevant to behavior. The factors leading to depression, they postulate, do so by 
affecting the SIP (Allen & Badcock, 2003). However, contrary to the SRH, Leary’s (1995, p. 
297) view is that self-esteem “are best viewed as reactions to real, anticipated or imagined 
rejection rather than as consequence of self-esteem per se” (p. 297). The SRH predicts, then, 
that negative interpersonal experiences should cause lower self-esteem, and depression is 
then predicted to come afterwards (prediction 6.7c).   
 It is appropriate to mention Spoor and Williams’ (2007) model, where the painful 
responses that humans feel when they are ostracized (see MacDonald & Leary, 2005; 
Wesselmann, Bagg, & Williams, 2009) is the workings of an evolved ostracism-detection 
device. Buss (1990) too has argued that the evolutionary dangers of ostracization, such as the 
loss of crucial reproductive opportunities, has been one of the selection pressures behind the 
evolution of anxiety. Kurzban and Leary (2001) have written about the other side of the 
fence: the evolution of psychological mechanisms behind exclusion and avoidance. Humans, 
Kurzban and Leary (2001) argue, are motivated to avoid poor social exchange partners, join 
cooperative groups, and avoid contact with people more likely to carry pathogens. Allen and 
Badcock (2003) are hence, not alone when arguing that group-processes such as exclusion, 
have been important in the evolution of humans. As humans have evolved a desire to increase 
their social investment potential (SIP), depression can be viewed as a strategy, when their SIP 
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is critically low. The SRH predicts, then, that the loss, or dissolution of significant 
interpersonal relationships, or experiences that are associated with low or inadequate social 
rank, induces depression (Allen & Badcock, 2003). The Social Competition Hypothesis 
predicts the same thing. However, Allen and Badcock (2003) go on to say that it is not only 
loss or defeat that induces depression, but all “socially relevant experiences that indicates (or 
has indicated through evolutionary history) to an individual that his or her ability to 
successfully invest in socially implicated endeavors is dangerously low” (p. 894). What cues 
from the environment can reveal social status? Allen and Badcock (2003) provide examples: 
negative interpersonal experiences (losses, rejections); failure of important social goals; 
perceived loss of rank or status; perception of lack of control in social situations. 
Furthermore, they include facial behavior, voice characteristics/verbal content and eye 
gaze/direction as relevant input from the social world. All these cues are relevant for testing 
the SRH, they should all contribute to depression because they have probably been reliable 
indicators of social exclusion (see prediction 6.7).  
Is depression reducing social risk? 
The SRH hypothesize that the evolutionary task of depression has been to reduce the 
variance in social outcomes until a more secure social position is established (Allen & 
Badcock, 2003). That is, Allen and Badcock (2003) argue that it has been adaptive for 
humans, when in danger of ostracization, to abstain from complex social endeavor’s such as 
competition and cooperation (which they view as highly variable), and instead shift their 
focus on eliciting support from their immediate circle of family and friends (reliable, low-
variance care). The SRH theory is inspired by work done in risk-sensitive foraging (Allen & 
Badcock, 2003; Caraco, Martindale, & Whittam, 1980; Hagen, 2011; Stephens, 1981). Hagen 
(2011) provides an example of how a wild animal might solve its energy-dilemmas: Imagine 
an animal that can either harvest strawberries or blueberries, where both have the same mean 
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energy return. But the return of strawberries is highly variable. If the animal has plenty of 
energy stored in its body fat or in its food reserve, it does not matter if the animal forages for 
strawberries or blueberries—both berries return, on average, the same energy. Now, imagine 
if the animal is slightly above its energy threshold; the body fat or food reserve are barely 
adequate for surviving the night. In this scenario, the wise strategy is to be risk-averse and 
forage for blueberries. Due to strawberries varied energy-return, the chances of coming home 
empty-handed is too great.  
This is what Allen and Badcock (2003, p. 893) hypothesize for human depression. 
“Just as in the financial context in which those with high levels of resources are able to 
tolerate the risk (i.e., the potential losses) associated with making more uncertain (but 
potentially higher pay-off) investments”, those who perceive their social value to exceed their 
social burden (that is, their SIP is high), are able, they continue, to “safely tolerate the risk 
associated with more speculative social investments” (p. 893). Opportunity-seeking strategies 
are risky, Allen and Badcock (2003; 2011) argue, and depressive behavior is not. Although 
this is certainly a possibility, it is not obvious. It is equally plausible that humans evolved a 
tendency to behave more riskfully under the threat of exclusion (Nettle, 2009). Consider an 
even more deprived situation for Hagen’s (2011) animal: The food reserve (and/or body fat) 
is well-below the danger-threshold. Here, the animal should forage on high-risk strawberries, 
because it at least provides a chance to reach the critical threshold, and hence avoid starvation 
(Hagen, 2011). The same logic could be applied to the down-regulation of mood in humans: 
if the threat of group-exclusion is dangerously high, do something drastic (risky-strategies, 
with potential large payoffs). Indeed, Nettle (2009, p. 5) writes: “…if low mood had been 
associated with exactly the opposite symptoms (increased energy and optimism, greater risk-
taking), that would have been equally easy to formulate an adaptive logic for”. The foraging 
literature can provide some hints. Caraco’s (1980) laboratory experiments found that the 
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food-preferences of yellow-eyed junkos (a North American bird) changed based on their 
energy-budget. Interpreting Caracos results, Stephens (1981) suggests a rule-of-thumb, that 
the Junkos operate by: be risk-averse if your expected 24-h energy budget is positive, be risk-
prone if your expected energy budget is negative. If we apply this logic to human sociality, it 
is expected that individuals threatened with exclusion should be risk-prone. However, the 
SRH’s predicts that when a human has low social value and self-esteem (low SIP), this 
individual should be risk-averse (depressed) in social situation. However, it might be the case 
that a risk-prone strategy, like it is for food-deprived Junkos, is more adaptive when your 
social value is low. Hence, the adaptive logic behind the SRH is not watertight. Of course, it 
is possible that depressive behaviors raises social value—the selection pressures behind 
sadness may be completely different than the evolution of risk-sensitive foraging. But, if so, 
how? Nettle (2009) tested this idea by using the same theoretical, mathematical paradigm 
used in the foraging literature (Stephens, 1981). Nettle’s (2009) model predicted that an 
organism should prefer the risky strategies when in a good state (that is, far away from the 
“dangerous” threshold), and, as the SRH predicts, prefer less risky behavior, in a step-by-step 
manner, when the state is approaching the dangerously low state (see fig 1 in Nettle (2009)). 
However, contrary to the SRH’s predictions, as the state deteriorates over a critical stage the 
strategy of choice becomes more, and more risky. The risky strategies are chosen, roughly, in 
a U-pattern: the ones in a really good state should choose the same risky strategies as the ones 
in a really bad state (Nettle, 2009). Analogously, there is evidence that both rats (Boakes, 
2007) and humans (Fessler, 2002; Holtkamp et al., 2003) become agitated under food-
restriction. This makes sense evolutionary, Fessler (2002, p. 381) argues, because starving 
humans “have little to lose, and much to gain, by pursuing the promise of immediate resource 
acquisition regardless of potential cost”. Indeed, the excessive running and workout anorexic 
patients often do, is probably a misfiring of such mechanisms (Fessler, 2002). So, 
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evolutionary speaking, why would a human that finds itself dangerously close to social 
exclusion “choose” a low-variance depression strategy? Nettle’s (2009) results indicate, at 
least theoretically, that the SRH’s prediction that low-variance, risk-averse strategies is 
adaptive in dire situations, such as an unfavorably low value/burden ratio (prediction 6.1), is 
inadequate at best. Nettle’s (2009) results does not falsify the SRH, but they strongly indicate 
that the theory is incomplete: When a depressives social situation increasingly worsen, the 
“depression strategy” should end in favor of a risky strategy.  
Interestingly, Nettle (2009) suggests that the increased energy and disinhibition in 
mania is a potential candidate for a high-risk, high-variance strategy that is activated in 
extremely dire situations. Another candidate is agitated depression (Nettle, 2009) (See the 
predictions based on Nettle (2009): 6.10 and 6.11). There is evidence that mania can be 
activated by dire social situations, such as the death of loved ones, known as “funeral mania” 
(Krishnan, Swartz, Larson, & Santoliquido, 1984; Rickarby, 1977). However, these studies 
are done on small samples, mainly on patients diagnosed with bipolar disorder, which, 
clearly, is no evidence of species-typical design. Especially given the evidence that some 
patients with schizophrenia and manic-depressive disorder have specific mutations, not 
shared by the general population or parkinson patients, in a gene (NURR1) relevant for the 
dopamine system (Buervenich et al., 2000). However, it is not known whether adversity-
caused mania is part of human nature, or if only individuals with heritable mutations have 
this ability. If the former is true, it would strongly suggests dysfunction rather than function 
(Kennair, 2010; Wakefield, 2005). Nettle’s (2009) predictions are novel and interesting 
nevertheless, and can potentially update, rather than falsify the SRH (prediction 6.10 and 
6.11).     
It is to be expected, if the SRH is true, that people, and organisms in general, who 
lack the ability to calculate social value and burden, should either lack, or show less evidence 
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of, depressive behavior (prediction 6.8a). Other mammals, human children, or humans with 
specific brain/cognitive pathologies (which show evidence of deficits in value/burden 
calculations) should be less depressed (prediction 6.8b) (Allen & Badcock, 2003). Indeed, 
Allen and Badcock predict that amongst individuals who have impairments in social 
cognition, such as autism, are less likely to be depressed because of a lack of ability to 
estimate social value and burden (Allen & Badcock, 2003). However, one comorbidity study 
(Leyfer et al., 2006) found that ten percent of children with autism met the DSM-IV criteria 
for major depression. Which is might be evidence against this notion. However, Baron-Cohen 
and his colleges (see Baron-Cohen, 1997b; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) have found 
evidence that people with autism lack the ability to make “theories of mind”, that is, the 
ability to impute beliefs, and predict the behavior of others. Baron-Cohen (1997b) calls it 
“mindblindness”. Although this is obviously a serious deficit in social cognition, it is possible 
that individuals with autism do not lack the ability to estimate social burden and value. If 
future scientific investigations show that autistic individuals lack the ability to estimate their 
own social value and burden, and at the same time, are often sad and minorly depressed, 
which is what the SRH attempts to explain, it would be a challenge to the SRH.  
The SRH predicts that mild depressives have faced several problematic interpersonal 
encounters in their history (Badcock & Allen, 2011). Presumably, from the SRH perspective, 
such experiences have activated the risk-aversive depressive mechanisms that are part of the 
normal evolved human architecture. In other words, the SRH predicts that anybody can 
become mildly depressed in specific contexts, for example while being socially excluded. 
This is contrary to data which indicate that some people, due to genetic vulnerability, are 
more likely than others to become depressed, even when exposed to the same stressors (Caspi 
et al., 2003; Kendler et al., 1999). However, it is unclear if this data would be different for the 
normal sadness and mild depression in which the SRH hypothesize on (see prediction 6.14 
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and 6.15). Hence, if it is shown that mild depressives have experienced no more social stress 
during their life, than the general population, the SRH is probably false. Noteworthy, it is 
known that the depressed state can alter the retrieval of past social failures. Memory retrieval 
is mood-dependent—sad people remember sad events, happy people remember happy events 
(Bower, 1981; Josephson, 1996). Potential mood-dependencies are important to acknowledge 
when using methods such as interviews and questionnaires when testing whether mild 
depressives have experienced more social stress/exclusion, for example by inquiring about 
bad interpersonal experiences when the study participants are in a neutral mood.  
The SRH also predicts that the lack of appetitive functions in depression, such as 
desire for food and sex, are activated because those symptoms reduce the depressives social 
burden (prediction 6.9) (Allen & Badcock, 2003).  
Tests of the Social Risk Hypothesis 
Three hypotheses derived from the SRH has been tested by Dunn, Whelton and 
Sharpe (2012). They asked full-time working Canadians from several professions to fill out 
surveys that measure the evolutionary-relevant variables for the SRH (and the SCH), such as 
the Defeat Scale (Gilbert & Allan, 1998) and the Social Comparison Scale (Allan & Gilbert, 
1995). The first hypothesis they tested is that attachment, social comparison and defeat would 
predict depressed mood (Prediction 6.12). Indeed, all of those factors predicted depressed 
mood, especially defeat, which was their strongest predictor (Dunn et al., 2012). This finding 
supports the Social Competition Hypothesis—perceptions of lost status are expected to 
induce depressed mood. Secondly, they predicted that self-esteem (SIP) should mediate the 
roles of attachment, social comparison and defeat (prediction 6.13). This was only partially 
supported, the link was only observed through the defeat variable: “when self-esteem is low, 
the impact of depression is magnified in those who are experiencing defeat in the social 
realm” (Dunn et al., 2012, p. 756). The third hypothesis Dunn, Whelton and Sharpe (2012) 
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tested was that depression should lead to the inhibition of social risk-taking behavior, 
submission and interpersonal sensitivity (prediction 6.14). They found, consistent with the 
SRH, that depression predicted interpersonal sensitivity and submission (Dunn et al., 2012). 
An obvious limitation of this study is that it found associations; the causal variables cannot be 
determined. Another model could potentially explain the data equally well (Dunn et al., 
2012).  
Relevant for the SIP, Leary et al (1995) tested his Sociometer Hypothesis by directly 
manipulating, in experiments, social inclusion and exclusion variables (See study 3 and 4 in 
Leary, Tambor, et al., 1995), they found that individuals who were deliberately excluded, had 
their self-esteem significantly reduced, indeed the authors write that they were “surprised that 
respondents responded as strongly as they did to being excluded by the group” (p. 524), 
although this strongly suggest that perceived exclusion induces averse emotions, Leary and 
his colleges (1995) did not test how this related to clinically depressed individuals, let alone 
whether mild depression is a part of humans evolved cognitive architecture.    
Badcock and Allen themselves (2003) have also tested aspects of their hypothesis. 
They did mood-induction experiment (with music). Both the depressed-mood and the neutral-
mood group were asked to respond on Wason’s selection tasks (Wason, 1966) with themes 
on attachment, social competition, truth detection and cheater-detection (See Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1992). The depressed-mood group had significantly more correct responses on the 
social competition selection task, but they failed to show significant superiority on the three 
other Wason selection tasks. The failure by the depressed-mood group to show superiority on 
truth-detection and cheater-detection was as Badcock and Allen (2003) predicted (there are 
evidence that cheater-detection is a cognitive adaptation, and is not necessarily expected to be 
mood-dependent). However, Badcock and Allen (2003) did also predict that members of the 
depressed group would outperform the neutral-mood group on the attachment selection task, 
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this was not supported. Overall, these findings provide strongest support, as Badcock and 
Allen (2003) point out themselves, for the Social Competition Hypothesis (Price et al., 1994): 
Humans in a depressed mood may have rank-related attentional biases (Badcock & Allen, 
2003).  
Given a human at the risk of exclusion, why is it useful to activate depressives 
behaviors, such as psychomotor retardation, suicidal cognition and so on? Is it not possible 
that a strategy could evolve where an individual invests more in social relationships, that is, 
for example, by temporarily cooperating and giving without expecting reciprocation from 
others, and thereby alter the value/burden ratio in their favor, instead of being depressed, and 
hence, be unable to provide efficiently because of psychomotor retardation, fatigue and so 
on? The SRH, as mentioned, is an attempt to explain sadness and mild depression. Severe 
strong psychomotor retardation, suicidal ideation and so on, is often more associated with 
major depression, but the SRH does not address how, and when, depression starts to 
dysfunction (is suicidal ideation, for instance, part of depressions design?). And, it is not 
obvious how mild sadness elevates social value. This needs to be tested further. Nevertheless, 
humans have been a very social mammal during the EEA, and have a strong desire for 
interpersonal attachments (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). This makes it plausible that 
ostracism-detection and social risk-taking have been involved in the evolution of affective 
states such as sadness and depression, but little is known. Tests of the SRH’s predictions 
might prove promising in furthering our understanding of normally functioning sadness and 
depression. 
Ultimate Theories on the Sex Difference in Depression  
Unipolar depression is typically twice as prevalent among women around the world 
(Lopez et al., 2006; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987; Weissman & Klerman, 1977). This finding is 
consistent, and it is a genuine difference, not caused by measurement artifacts (Weissman et 
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al., 1993). Although, worthy of notice, the gender difference might be smaller in developing 
countries (Culbertson, 1997). Depression, then, like height, is sexually dimorphic, which 
requires an explanation (D. Buss, personal communication). In evolution, gender-differences 
are intriguing. Natural selection tends to decrease phenotypic variance in a population. This 
happens because higher-fitness traits spread more rapidly, eventually leading to fixation, and 
thus reduce variance (See Barkow et al., 1992). Most adaptations are species-typical—all 
members of a species reliably develop the adaptation. A large gender difference in any 
species, therefore, suggests that males and females have reliably faced different selection 
pressures in their evolutionary history (Buss, 1995a, 1995b). Is this the case the with human 
depression? Why does this difference exist? We know that females start getting more 
depressed than males at the age of 13 (Hankin & Abramson, 2001; Hyde, Mezulis, & 
Abramson, 2008; Thapar, Collishaw, Pine, & Thapar, 2012). The fact that the difference 
starts emerging at the onset of puberty, and not earlier or later, suggests that proximate 
factors such as gender-specific hormones, and the genes they activate, might play a role in the 
development of depression.  
Hormonal changes in the reproductive systems affect neuronal systems (especially 
serotonergic ones), which affect mood (Noble, 2005). Sex hormones seem to be important 
because semen in women’s reproductive tracts have been shown to negatively correlate with 
depressive symptoms (not explained by sexual activity per se), suggesting that the estrogen, 
testosterone, and prostaglandins in the semen, which is absorbed into the bloodstream 
(Benziger & Edelson, 1983), play a role in modulating mood (Burch & Gallup, 2006; Gordon 
Jr, Burch, & Platek, 2002). This supports Ney’s hypothesis where he suggested that “a 
woman through her vagina absorbs sufficient quantities of the prostaglandins from her 
partner’s semen, to affect her mood” (1986, p. 221). Adding to this, using a random sample 
of 9792 people in the UK, Bebbington et al. (1998) found evidence that the gender difference 
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is strongest during women’s reproductive years. And that there was a “clear reversal of the 
sex difference in prevalence of depression in those over age 55” (Bebbington et al., 1998, p. 
9). Postmenopausal women, it seems, are not more likely to be depressed than men of the 
same age. And this could not be explained, Bebbington et al. (1998) claim, by differences in 
marital status, child care, or employment.  
Another, probably not mutually exclusive, proximate factor that can account for the 
increase in adolescent depression, particularly amongst girls (Thapar et al., 2012), is the 
difficult changes and challenges in the social and sexual arena (Petersen et al., 1993). The 
cognitive and affective changes, too, during adolescence (Steinberg, 2005), such as capacities 
for metacognition, and affective states such as shame (Reimer, 1996), might also play a role 
in the increase of depression amongst adolescents generally, and amongst girls particularly. 
There are many other proximate factors involved in the pubertal emergence of the gender 
difference, and many have been discussed in the literature, such as rumination, temperament, 
negative life events, and genes (See Hyde et al., 2008, for a good discussion and integration 
of these). However, we do not know why women are more depressed. I will now go on to 
discuss the predictions on the sex-difference in depression from the Reproductive Failure 
Theory (Suarez & Gallup, 1985) and from some of the theories that have already been 
discussed for depression in general: the Social Competition Hypothesis, the Bargaining 
Hypothesis, the Analytical Rumination Hypothesis and the Social Risk Hypothesis, and, 
lastly, predictions from Sexual Selection Theory.   
Reproductive Failure Theory. 
Suarez and Gallup (1985, p. 280) argued that women are oftener depressed because 
their reproductive stakes are higher: 
The fact that women are normally fertile for only a few days each month, release only 
a limited number of eggs, and thus have far fewer opportunities to enhance their 
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fitness than men, who are continuously fertile and produce hundreds of thousands of 
sperm on a daily basis, may be a contributing factor to the sex difference in the 
incidence of depression.  
Men experience less depression than women, Suarez and Gallup (1985) proposes, 
because men have more reproductive possibilities throughout life. Suarez and Gallup (1985) 
also point out that mothers can be certain that their offspring share 50% of their genes, while 
males, due to cuckoldry and rape, perpetually live under the evolutionary shadow of 
paternity-uncertainty. Thus, Suarez and Gallup (1985) argue that females are, to a larger 
degree, able to “measure” their reproductive success at any point in time. Furthermore, 
“females”, Suarez and Gallup (1985, p. 280) reminds us, “bear a much greater biological 
burden (e.g. pregnancy, childbirth, breastfeeding, and child rearing)”. Indeed, maternity-
certainty and paternity-uncertainty have been used successfully to test evolutionary 
predictions on human sex differences in the past (See Buss, 1989, 1994a; Symons, 1979).  
Because of women’s measurement ability and the biological cost just mentioned, 
Suarez and Gallup (1985) argue that reproductive failure is more obvious to females, and thus 
are more prone to depression (see prediction 7.1). Females have more to lose. Moreover, 
Suarez and Gallup (1985) point out that depression is typically triggered by acute personal 
crisis such as the loss of a child, spouse, job, home, pet and so on. Presumably, women’s 
evolved depressive mechanisms are more easily triggered after the loss of a child (they do not 
discuss the other examples in detail), due to menopause and greater biological investment in 
offspring. Another important prediction from the Reproductive Failure theory (Suarez & 
Gallup, 1985) is that women who already have children should be less depressed in response 
to child loss, relative to women who are childless (prediction 7.2). Connolly and Edelmann 
(1988) used data from an infertility clinic to test prediction 7.1 and 7.2. They found that 
females scored significantly higher than males on their overall measures of distress after 
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experiencing a reproductive failure (providing preliminary support for prediction 7.1). 
However, this finding might simply be due to the fact that women are more depressed in the 
populations as a whole, not necessarily because of differences in reaction to reproductive 
failure (Connolly & Edelmann, 1988). The second prediction did not receive support: There 
was no significant difference in distress between childless women and women with children. 
This was also the case with the men (Connolly & Edelmann, 1988).  
Noteworthy, according to Dominian (1977; cited in Suarez & Gallup, 1985), 
ovariohysterectomy, the surgical removal of the uterus and ovaries, or, as Suarez and Gallup 
(1985, p. 281) refers to it “surgically produced menopause”, tend to induce depression. This 
lead Suarez and Gallup (1985) to predict that sterilization induces depression, and that it 
should be inversely proportional to the number of existing offspring (prediction 7.3). Of 
course tests of these predictions must control for potential depressive rumination a 
sterilization procedure might induce because rumination has been found as one mediator for 
why women are more depressed (Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999). It remains to 
be tested whether testicle removal show the same signs in men. Notably, Bailey and Hurd 
(2005) found that men with more feminine finger length ratios, show a positive correlation 
with levels of depression, which indicates that lower prenatal exposure to the sex hormone 
testosterone, is associated with depression in men. Suarez and Gallup (1985) predicts that, 
depending on family size and availability to resources, pregnancy should counteract 
depression (prediction 7.4). Although it has been argued that postpartum depression is not a 
distinct diagnosis (Whiffen, 1991, 1992), and thus might not even exist, it is unclear whether 
childbirth can counteract depression. Even so, they predict that the hospital practice of 
removing the child from the mother after birth simulates child loss, and hence produce 
postpartum depression (prediction 7.5). It should be expected that PPD should be more 
prevalent in hospitals that enforce this practice. Furthermore, Suarez and Gallup (1985) 
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predict, using a somewhat similar logic as Hamilton’s inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964), that 
the severity of a woman’s depression at menopause should be greater in childless woman, 
less so in mothers, and even less in grandmothers (see prediction 7.7). And, we would also 
expect that, given the lack of future reproductive oppurtunities, menopaused aged-women 
will experience more depression after child loss, than younger women that still have their 
reproductive years ahead of them (prediction 7.6). 
The ultimate question, in regards to all of the above, still remains: Why does the 
gender difference exist? Suarez and Gallup (1985) postulate two possibilities for the ultimate 
function of depression.  
The first one is a learning capacity. Infant loss, and other forms of reproductive 
failure, they argue, may have been a byproduct of inappropriate parenting or other behaviors. 
As such, the individuals that experienced depression will likely not repeat the behaviors that 
lead to reproductive failure. Depression, here, will function like the nausea and vomiting 
experienced by an uncareful eater of poisonous food - that food will be avoided in the future.  
The second, not mutually exclusive, function Suarez and Gallup (1985, p. 285) 
propose is that the depressed person “may have been more likely to become the object of aid 
giving, assistance, and solace, thus partially offsetting the loss”. This function is similar to the 
Bargaining Hypothesis and Social Navigation Hypothesis (Hagen, 2003; Watson & Andrews, 
2002).  
It is not clear how these functions explain the gender difference in depression, as the 
authors do not attempt to address this in detail. Presumably, men and women possess the 
same adaptations for depression, but women have been under heavier selection pressures to 
have these mechanisms more easily activated by environmental triggers such as the loss of a 
child. Females’ fitness may have suffered more from parenting-mistakes, and have more to 
gain by help-elicitation from others. Suarez and Gallup provide more predictions in their 
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paper, which deserve attempts of falsification. The depression experienced after reproductive 
failure, should be reduced by the reproductive success of one’s other children (prediction 
7.8), and that foster children, even pets, would activate the mothers’ child-rearing 
mechanisms and hence reduce depression (prediction 7.9). This is an interesting prediction, 
as it can be tested in a psychotherapeutic context: Misfiring of child-rearing mechanisms 
(such as pet ownership) relieves depression, particularly amongst women. I am unaware of 
any direct tests of this, but it has been found (Krause-Parello, 2012, p. 199) that “pet 
attachment support acted as a coping resource between loneliness and depressed mood”. 
Furthermore, Suarez and Gallup note (as cited in Dominian, 1977) that 37% of the divorces 
in the United States happened during the menopausal state of the women. This lead them to 
predict that the divorce rates should be higher in couples who have experienced infertility, 
miscarriages, stillbirth, neonatal death, or menopause  (Suarez & Gallup, 1985) (prediction 
7.10). Importantly, Suarez and Gallup do not make it clear why depression would help a 
woman in such situations, is it a manifestation of the first (learning) or second (help-
elicitation) ultimate function, or both? Although it is a possibility, there is no direct evidence 
that depression serve such functions, neither in hunter-gatherer societies or modern 
environments, for women who have failed reproductively.  
Reproductive failure is, of course, by definition selected against in evolution. If 
depression genes are associated with reproductive failure, why would they prevail? Implicit 
in Suarez and Gallup’s (1985) hypothesis is the fact that the world is unpredictable, and 
hence a learning mechanism (depression) evolved so as to reduce the chances of repeating 
behaviors that led to the reproductive loss. Depression is activated in these situations (just as 
physical pain, depression acts as psychic pain) to avoid repetition of maladaptive behavior.   
A last point worth mentioning from Suarez and Gallup (1985) is a phylogenetic one. 
They predict that the degree to which depressive behavior is displayed after reproductive 
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failure in a particular species, is dependent on its history of K versus R selection. That is, the 
quality vs quantity of offspring; higher and lower parental investment (Prediction 7.11). 
Suarez and Gallup (1985) provide a few interesting examples to their readers. Prosimians 
(e.g. Lemurs), which fall on the R-selected continuum, largely ignore their dead infants 
(Cowgill, 1969; as cited in Suarez & Gallup, 1985), while the more K-selected great apes, 
such as the gorilla and chimpanzee, show more “elaborate depressive behaviors in response 
to dead conspecifics” (Suarez & Gallup, 1985, p. 284).  
The Social Competition Hypothesis and the Sex Difference in Depression 
The fact that women are more likely to be depressed than men, seems to contradict the 
SCH. The SCH postulates that depression is an involuntary losing strategy after agonistic 
behavior (e.g. fighting). If this is true, it seems unlikely that women have been more involved 
in such situations than men. In the article where the Social Competition Hypothesis is 
postulated (Price et al., 1994), the sex difference is only briefly mentioned, but they hint at 
one interesting, novel prediction: When women have equal opportunities (presumably 
referring to power and social roles), the “female excess of depression disappears” (Prediction 
8.1) (Price et al., 1994, p. 312). Their prediction is vague, as “equal opportunities” is not 
operationalized, or discussed further by Price et al. (1994). If their prediction is true, 
however, the sex difference in depression should be sensitive to equality in different 
societies. Hunter-gatherer societies often enjoy a great equality of wealth (Woodburn, 1982), 
which would lead us to expect that the sex difference would be smaller, or disappear 
altogether, in these societies (prediction 8.2).  
The Analytical Rumination Hypothesis and the Sex Difference in Depression  
Andrews and Watson discuss the sex difference in depression in their 2009 article on 
the ARH (See section on the ARH). Their hypothesis is that social strain can reduce young 
women’s ability to acquire resources, support, and protection. Men, then, have not been under 
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the same selection pressures, which explain the lower rate of depression. Hence, Andrews 
and Thomson (2009) point out, it may be adaptive to down-regulate reproductive functioning. 
This can explain women’s reduced fertility and pregnancy-outcomes when depressed. It has 
been observed too, that counterfactual analysis mediates the sex difference (See Treynor, 
Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). This suggests that women spend more analytical 
resources to prevent interpersonal problems (Andrews and Thomson, 2009). As mentioned in 
the introduction to the sex-difference section, the sex difference develops after the onset of 
sexual maturity, further suggesting it is an adaptation that reliably develops in women when 
resources, support and protection are needed the most. This leads to the prediction that two 
risk factors for depression in women is 1. Raising children alone, 2. inadequate resources to 
raise children (prediction 9.2). This is similar to Hagen’s (1999) defection hypothesis 
(discussed soon). The number of family or friends that helps with raising children, and higher 
income should decrease the chances of a woman developing a depressive episode (see 
prediction 9.2). These effects should not be observed in men, or at least, to a smaller degree, 
because men have probably not raised children alone in the evolutionary past, and hence, 
have not been under the same selective pressures. Further, Andrews and Thomson (2009, p. 
638) hypothesize that women have been under greater selective pressures to avoid exposure 
to social stress, and hence predict that “women spend more effort analyzing the future 
consequences of different decisions (promoted by depressed affect) and being vigilant for 
signs of potential stress (promoted by anxious affect)”. Hence, it is predicted that women 
have been selected to ruminate more, than men. Which lead us to expect that women tend to 
avoid and solve social problems more effectively than men (prediction 9.1). 
The Bargaining Hypothesis and the Sex Difference in Depression  
Hagen, Watson and Thomson (2004) writing from the perspective of the Bargaining 
Hypothesis, predict that women are more depressed than men, because women have more 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES ON WHY DEPRESSION EXIST  69 
 
often been victims of social manipulation. This happens, they propose, because women in the 
EEA have more often resided with their husbands relatives (not their own kin), which has led 
to more within-group conflict (Hagen et al.) (prediction 10.1). And, they postulate, because 
physical aggression has been a more costly conflict-resolution strategy for women. For these 
two reasons, MDD has been a safer but slower strategy for women (prediction 10.2a). Also, 
women experience more MDD because their reproductive potential is scarce compared to 
men, which makes it worth the effort to control and obtain resources through the use of 
MDD. If this is true, women across cultures are expected to actually receive more resources 
when they are depressed compared to men (prediction 10.2b).  
Hagen, importantly, has hypothesized that postpartum depression is a bargaining 
strategy (Defection Hypothesis). 
Postpartum Depression: The Defection Hypothesis 
It is costly, both in terms of time and calories, to be pregnant (at least 80000 kcal, see 
Thomson & Hytten, 1961), and to lactate (A. M. Thomson, Hytten, & Billewicz, 1970). 
Additionally, human children are extraordinarily dependent on their caregivers. And, unlike 
many other mammals, humans provide biparental care for their offspring. Given the costs 
involved, human women are likely to have been under selective pressures to make good 
reproductive decisions: to weigh the costs and benefits. It is expected, then, that ancestral 
human mothers have evolved sensitive detection-devices for whether a man will invest in her 
children. And, evolve a manipulative strategy when the father, or others, indeed do not 
cooperate by providing resources. This idea Hagen (1999) calls the defection hypothesis: 
Depression is an adaptation that informs mothers that they are suffering a fitness cost. In 
addition to the Bargaining idea, this is derived from the psychic pain idea, which, similarly to 
physical pain, tells an organism that “what you are doing can damage your fitness”, hence the 
mother will take action to decrease the psychic pain. When mothers are majorly depressed 
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postpartum, Hagen (1999) propose that the ultimate function of this is to negotiate greater 
levels of social support. 
Hagen’s (1999) ideas are based upon two important aspects of theoretical 
evolutionary biology. The first is Trivers’ (1974) Parental-investment (PI) theory. Parents and 
children, particularly in species which invest highly in their offspring (traditionally referred 
to as K-selection, now, more generally as life-history theory), have conflicting needs and 
priorities. For example, children are selected for acquiring an abundance of resources, for the 
longest possible time from their parents. Parents, on the other hand, are selected for diverting 
their resources and attention towards all their offspring (and, particularly the children who are 
most likely to have reproductive success) or other mating opportunities. The benefit-cost ratio 
differs depending on whether you view it from the parent or the newborns perspective (that 
is, their genes perspective). Hence, parents do not automatically invest in new offspring: A 
human mother, and other K-selected species, must balance survival, growth and development 
on one hand and reproduction at the other (Hagen, 1999). As predicted by PI theory, the food 
and care supplied to Yanomamö children during a short-term food crisis, caused by the 1998 
El Niño, as measured by subcutaneous fat and skin flea infections, were distributed unequally 
(Hagen, Hames, Craig, Lauer, & Price, 2001). Hagen (1999) points out that PI conflict makes 
it clear how a mother could, in the absence of resources and infant problems, neglect, 
abandon or kill her offspring. It does not make clear, however, why these circumstances leads 
to motherly depression (Hagen, 1999). 
Secondly, Hagen (1999) points to Axelrod and Hamilton’s (see Axelrod, 2006; 1981) 
game-theoretic models of cooperation (prisoners dilemma). Their game models show that 
cooperation can only evolve if it is possible to defect from it. Natural selection does not favor 
blind cooperation - that would leave an organism vulnerable to exploitation. This is where 
Hagen (1999) draws the analogy to human childrearing: If a woman’s costs of raising her 
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new child exceeds the evolutionary benefits, depression activates a “defection” strategy: 
cooperate with me or I will stop mothering. The insights from PI theory and the evolution of 
cooperation, provides a hypothesis-generating framework. Is PPD a strategy for calculating 
investments in offspring and/or a defection strategy? Although Hagen’s (1999) hypothesis is 
based on sound evolutionary logic, the very existence, as mentioned under the Reproductive 
Failure theory, of postpartum depression is non-obvious. Indeed, while reviewing the 
evidence for the role of endocrine factors in PDD, Bloch, Daly and Rubinow (2003) note that 
there might be hormonal changes during the postpartum period that can trigger depression in 
a subgroup of women (thus probably not part of a universal human nature), and, they also 
warn that  “in the general population, the prevalence of depression in the postpartum period 
has not been convincingly shown to be increased over that seen in periods unrelated to 
childbirth”. Hence, the phenomenon that the Defection Hypothesis is trying to explain might, 
in the future, prove to be an example of an adaptive hypothesis which is not only wrong, but 
attempts to explain something that does not exist. Although PDD is common (13% according 
to a metanalysis O'hara & Swain, 1996), Whiffen (1992) has argued that PDD is 
indistinguishable from non-childbearing depression: It is predicted by the same variables (see 
also Whiffen, 1991). Nevertheless, this issue is still unsettled.    
In Hagen’s (1999) analysis, motherly depression works as a labor strike (this is also 
true for the Bargaining Hypothesis generally). The ultimate function Hagen (1999) postulates 
is that Postpartum Depression (PPD) is designed to reduce or eliminate investments in 
offspring under certain circumstances, and to negotiate investment from others (Hagen, 
1999). Concretely, depression is activated when the mother perceives either 1) a lack of 
social support and/or 2) infant problems (see prediction 11.1, 11.5, 11.15a and b).  Hagen’s 
postpartum theory is similar the Bargaining Theory (Hagen, 2003) and the Social Motivation 
Function theory of the SNH (Watson & Andrews, 2002), hence, the predictions from those 
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theories are also relevant for the defection hypothesis, and vice versa. The difference, here, 
lies in the specificity: The context in which depression is activated (after childbirth). 
The Defection Hypothesis predicts four etiological factors for PPD (Hagen, 1999). 
The first two are straightforward: PPD is induced in a woman if there is insufficient 
investment from the father or others (prediction 11.1). Hagen (1999) points to two meta-
analysis that found “social support”, amongst other predictors, to be linked with PDD (Beck, 
1996; O'hara & Swain, 1996). The second etiological factor Hagen (1999) predicts is that 
PPD is activated when infant liability is low. That is, if there are problems with pregnancy, 
birth or with the infant itself (See predictions 11.2 and 11.6). Adverse environmental 
conditions such as insufficient resources, should also induce PDD in mothers, and also 
increase the chance that mothers kill their infants (prediction 11.2, 11.3, 11.6). The last 
etiological factor Hagen (1999) postulates regards opportunity costs. Rather than investing in 
a newborn, a mother might have more to gain by 1) investing in existing offspring, 2) the 
mothers own survival (mothering can be dangerous, especially if resources are scarce) or 3) 
finding a better mate. Hagen (1999) therefore predicts PDD will be activated in these 
situations (prediction 11.4). 
Hagen (1999) provides us with more predictions for testing the defection hypothesis. 
Some expand on the etiological factors sketched above: Lack of social support, low infant 
viability and poor environments should predict negative affect (prediction 11.5, 11.6 & 11.7, 
respectively). Hagen conducted a study (2002) in which he tested some of the predictions 
from the defection hypothesis. He predicted that mothers who face social constraints on 
abortion from their husband—mothers unable to simply defect from their pregnancy—would 
be at greater risk for PPD. This was supported. Also, as predicted, husbands constrains on 
abortion correlated with the mothers PDD. Hagen (2002) also found support for his 
prediction regarding fathers: sexually successful men, but not women, are at risk for PPD 
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under socially imposed monogamy, even when controlling for relationship quality (Hagen, 
2002). This suggest that men with other sexual opportunities are at risk for PPD (although 
maternal depression has been found to be the best predictor of paternal postpartum depression 
Goodman, 2004). Hagen (2002) also found support for the prediction that fathers PPD levels 
correlated positively (rs = .35) with mothers investment in childcare. Mothers PPD levels, 
too, were correlated (r = .41) with increased investment by fathers. This suggests that both 
mothers and fathers can use depression as a bargaining strategy postpartum: Depression 
might increase investment in the non-depressed partner. Furthermore, Hagen (2002) found 
that women over 35 with one child, had fewer postpartum symptoms than women under 35 
with one child, supporting the notion that women with reproductive possibilities in the future 
have more to gain by defecting from parenting (also consistent with the Reproductive Failure 
theory, prediction 7.13). Noteworthy, Hagen’s (2002) study found correlations, other tests of 
the Defection Hypothesis predictions might be able to falsify the causal factors. Hagen (1999) 
is not clear on when the Defection Hypothesis predicts fatherly depression. If postpartum 
depression turns out to be just as likely in men, or show the same sex-ratio as the general 
population, the Defection Hypothesis alone cannot explain why women are more depressed 
in general. That is, depressions unrelated to childbirths.  
Importantly, Hagen (1999) also predicts that PPD should be cross-culturally universal 
(prediction 11.8). Nancy Howell’s (1979/2000) observation that some hunter-gatherer !Kung 
women experience postpartum depression and anxiety, might provide some preliminary 
support for this. Additionally, Hagen and Barrett (2007) asked Shuar mothers (from a village 
in the Ecuadorian Amazon) about sadness during pregnancy. They reported several reasons 
for being sad (see table 3 and 5 in Hagen and Barret, 2007 for details): “problems with 
relationship”, “husband left” (lack of social support); “poor health prior to and during 
pregnancy” (poor maternal health); “didn’t want child because got pregnant too soon due to 
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short interbirth interval” (oppurtunity costs).  
Hagen (1999) also emphasizes that PPD should not be a hormonal byproduct 
(prediction 11.9). An adaptation, of course, is expected to have hormonal, neural, or other 
physiological correlates. The presence or absence, therefore, of particular hormonal activity 
in depressed mothers is neutral to the Defection Hypothesis (Hagen, 1999).   
If the defection hypothesis is correct, an investing father and a healthy infant should 
dramatically decrease the risk for PPD (see prediction 11a & b). As a logical extension, PPD 
should be more prevalent in societies with more single-moms, especially where they do not 
receive monetary benefits from the state (or anyone else) (prediction 11.16).  
The Social Risk Hypothesis and the Sex Difference in Depression 
Allen and Badcock (2003) suggest that the increase in depression amongst women 
around puberty is explained by social-cognitive developments that occur in early 
adolescence. For example, they suggest, it is possible that women develop a capacity for 
empathic accuracy or shame, more than it has to do with “strictly biological maturation” 
(Allen & Badcock, 2003, p. 906). Although this produces useful predictions on proximate 
factors, Allen and Badcock (2003) are not clear on why women would develop more accurate 
shame and empathic tendencies, not how it is evolutionary useful, let alone why shame and 
empathy should be more useful for women than for men. 
Allen and Badcock (2003) share the view of McGuire and Troisi (1998; 2001) who 
have proposed that the gender difference in depression can be explained by the gender 
difference in the attainment, and prioritization of biological goals (such as reproduction, 
survival, resource acquisition, kin investment), and the stress that is caused by impediments 
of these goals. The capacity to achieve biological goals without social assistance, Allen and 
Badcock (2003) argue, is greater for males than females, which “should place a greater 
selective pressure on females to maintain a more risk-averse approach to many types of 
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relationships, including but not limited to mating relationships” (p. 904) (see prediction 
12.1a-c). This predicts that females are more sensitive to social threats (prediction 12.2). This 
presumes that depressed behavior—risk-averse strategies—actually help women attain their 
biological goals to a greater degree than what risk-prone strategies do. And, also, that this has 
been particularly useful for women during the EEA, which explains why women are more 
often depressed. 
The evolved modules of the mind, are likely to be highly specialized, and content-
specific (Barkow et al., 1992; Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Kurzban, 2012). Biological goals, 
then, such as resource acquisition, are unlikely to be as general as Allen and Badcock (2003) 
describe. Nevertheless, they might have been important differential selection pressures in 
these domains, and testing of prediction 12.1a-c and 12.2, might illuminate the nature of the 
gender difference in sadness and depression.       
Sexual Selection Theory and the Sex Difference in Depression 
It has been argued that differential sexual selection pressures on women and men 
during evolutionary history shape the emergence of “internalizing” disorders, such as 
depression and anxiety, in adolescent girls, and “externalizing” disorders, such as ADHD, 
during childhood in boys (Martel, 2013). The average sex differences in dispositional traits, 
which have likely been shaped by sexual selection, such as sensation-seeking (more in males 
Cross, Copping, & Campbell, 2011) and neuroticism (more in females Jorm, 1987) might 
interact with risk-alleles such as the 5-HTT for depression in producing depression (Martel, 
2013) (prediction 13.1 and 13.2). Intrasexual selection during females evolutionary history 
regarding mate-choice, social support, pregnancy and child-rearing, might have equipped 
women with a sensitivity to the cohesion of interpersonal relationships (Martel, 2013) (see 
prediction 13.4a). The sexually selected sex-specific genes, then, which produce sex-
dependent exposure to sex hormones during development and during puberty might produce 
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psychological mechanisms that process information from the environment differently—
sensitivity to interpersonal stress, for instance—depending whether you are a girl or a boy 
(prediction 13.4b). Which, in turn, it is predicted, contribute to the group-level sex difference 
of depression in adulthood. Hence, depression, at least in severe forms is a dysfunction in this 
view: Adaptive sexually selected traits interact with genetic vulnerability and developmental 
stressors to produce depression in some people, particularly in women.  
Side-effect Theories 
Infection-Prevention and Depression 
According to Raison and Miller’s (2012) Pathogen Host Defense Hypothesis 
(PATHOS-D) depression exists because it shields from pathogenic attacks. PATHOS-D 
shifts the “adaptive context of depression risk alleles from relations with conspecifics to 
relations with the microbial world” (p. 1). Raison and Miller (2012) collected genetic data 
from PubMed and Ovid MEDLINE and found support for their hypothesis: Several risk 
alleles for depression contribute to immunological and behavioral defenses from pathogens. 
They point to several genes that are linked to both depression and immunological functions. 
The PATHOS-D hypothesis predicts that allelic risk variants for depression should be located 
in genes with known immune effects (prediction 14.1a), increase signaling in inflammatory 
defense pathways (prediction 14.1b), and increase survival in the context of infection 
(prediction 14.1c).  
To humans, pathogens are deadly predators. They are microorganisms that, due to 
short generational life-span, rapidly evolve sophisticated methods of securing a place within 
their host and spreading to others. These invasive intruders have, and still do, play a lead role 
in the evolution of the mammalian immune system. In fact, DNA sequences for host defense 
existed before the plants and animals diverged (Janeway, Travers, Walport, & Shlomchik, 
2001) 1576 ± 88  million years ago (Wang, Kumar, & Hedges, 1999). Like the ever-evolving 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES ON WHY DEPRESSION EXIST  77 
 
swiftness of the attacking lion and fleeing gazelle, pathogens and immune systems are in an 
evolutionary arms race, giving rise to complex adaptations at both sides. Before humans 
invented effective defenses like vaccines, antibiotics and water treatments, bacteria and 
viruses were even more dense and dangerous. Indeed, as Jared Diamond (1997) describes in 
Guns, germs and steel, pathogens have claimed more lives than any war, and have 
profoundly shaped human history. 
Interestingly, and consistent with PATHOS-D, the short version of the previously 
mentioned 5-HTTLPR gene protects against sudden infant death syndrome, which has been 
associated with death caused by infection (See Opdal, Vege, & Rognum, 2008). Furthermore, 
the frequency of the short allele around the world correlates with the historical burden of 
disease-causing pathogens in that area (See M. Murray & Murray, 1979; Raison & Miller, 
2012).  Despite the manifold way that, as Raison and Miller (2012, p. 1.) argue, “depression 
impairs Darwinian fitness”, the depressive risk-alleles have not been wiped out by natural 
selection because these genes also code for the immunological and behavioral responses to 
infection from pathogens.  
The average fitness benefits that the risk-alleles provide in fighting pathogens, Raison 
and Miller argue, are greater than the cost of depression. Moreover, the immune system is not 
fully developed during infancy and infection has been the primary cause of death for infants 
during evolutionary history (Raison & Miller, 2012). This produces even stronger selection 
pressures for pathogen defense: Death is particularly detrimental to fitness at prepubescent 
age. The failure to survive infancy is an evolutionary catastrophe, adult melancholy a 
darwinian misfortune. 
This is a vital point in PATHOS-D: Risk-alleles for depression are adaptive not 
because of any purpose sadness per se may serve (indeed, despite of), but because the risk-
alleles also code for pathogen host defense. Thus, risk-alleles influence on social functioning 
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are considered side effects. This raises the question of why genes for depression and host 
defense evolved to be connected in the first place. Raison and Miller (2012, p. 9) address this 
issue and suggest that there is no a priori “reason why these antipathogen effects should 
overlap with the depressogenic effects of these risk alleles. That they do so is powerful 
evidence, we would suggest, for the primacy of immune defense in the pathogenesis of 
depression, regardless of the environmental adversity that initiates the disorder in individual 
cases”. Other theorizers (Anders, Tanaka, & Kinney, 2013) on depression and infection-
prevention, have suggested that depression itself might be linked to the “behavioral immune 
system” (see Schaller & Duncan, 2007; Schaller & Park, 2011), and hence do not consider 
depression as merely a side-effect of pathogen defense, but an adaptive defense in its own 
right. This does not contradict Raison and Miller’s (2012) hypothesis, as they also emphasize 
the adaptive behavioral role that depression might have, but Anders, Tanaka and Kinney 
(2013) and Kinney and Tanaka (2009) also stress the cognitive factors (such as lack of 
concentration) as part of the adaptive response.   
Raison and Miller (2012) presents four ways elements of depression are adaptive: 1) 
Fever and hypoferremia (iron-depletion), 2) conservation withdrawal, 3) hypervigilance and, 
4) anorexia. As all four are relevant for understanding the adaptive arguments in PATHOS-D, 
I discuss them below, along with some of the evidence.  
The mammalian inflammatory response produces a set of symptoms known as 
sickness behavior (See Dantzer & Kelley, 2007), this includes fever and hypoferremia (iron-
deficiency).  As exemplified in the introduction, fever and iron-depletion are part of an 
adaptive central motivational state evolved to promote pathogen defense (See Kluger et al., 
1998; Raison & Miller, 2012). Fever is induced by inflammatory mechanisms, but the 
elevated body-temperature itself hinders further replication of pathogens, decreasing the 
chances of death.  Raison and Miller (2012) argue that “if depressive symptoms aid in 
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pathogen defense, and fever and hypoferremia are important in this regard, one would expect 
individuals with MDD to have elevated temperatures and reduced bodily stores of iron, even 
in individuals with no evidence of an infectious process” (p. 9) (prediction 14.5a). As the 
authors reference themselves, there is indeed evidence that patients with depression have 
elevated body temperatures (Rausch et al., 2003) and reductions in bodily iron storage (Maes 
et al., 1996). Raison and Miller (2012) point out that PATHOS-D predicts these findings and 
that their absence would strongly argue against its validity.  As they put it, referring to iron 
depletion and fever: “… If depression is simply a nonadaptive phenomenon, why would such 
ancient, highly conserved and highly complex physiological responses be a hallmark of the 
disorder?” (p. 9). Both non-adaptive theories and theories focusing on social benefits of 
depression, fail to explain these findings. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Raison and Miller (2012) 
think of symptoms of sickness and depression (particularly MDD) as largely overlapping 
concepts. That is, as symptoms promoted by the mammalian inflammatory response under 
infection. Although the distinction still remains unclear, the similarity of MDD and sickness 
behavior has likely not escaped clinicians notice.   
As well as fever and hypoferremia, proinflammatory cytokines induces conservation-
withdrawal, this is the behavioral effect of the sickness behavior: depressed mood, anhedonia 
(inability to experience pleasure), psychomotor retardation, fatigue, social avoidance and 
anorexia (Dantzer, O'Connor, Freund, Johnson, & Kelley, 2008; Raison & Miller, 2012).  In 
addition to the well-established purpose of allocating metabolic resources to tissue repair and 
fever-generation during infection, Raison and Miller (2012) postulate that conservation-
withdrawal is adaptive by attenuating infectious exposure by reducing interpersonal contact. 
This is also a primary focus of Kinney and Tanaka (2009). This is in direct contrast to the 
Bargaining Hypothesis which predict that family-members are forced to help a depressive 
(which presumably involves some interpersonal contact). The typical sickness behaviors are 
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also considered adaptive under the PATHOS-D perspective. Using the logic of Hamilton’s 
(1964) inclusive fitness, Raison and Miller (2012) suspect that social withdrawal enhances 
fitness by reducing the risk of infecting kin. Better to—speaking from the ‘selfish’ gene’s 
point of view—leave some copies of myself in the bodies of kin, than risk death from 
infectious diseases of every copy. Some preliminary support for this might come from a study 
which found that participants injected with proinflammatory cytokines experienced feelings 
of social disconnection (Eisenberger, Inagaki, Mashal, & Irwin, 2010). This suggests a two-
way causality between inflammation and depressive thought. Also noteworthy, Kinney and 
Tanaka (2009) hypothesize not only that withdrawal behaviors reduce the risk of infecting 
kin, but that it signals to family members that “the infected individual is potentially 
contagious, so kin should minimize contact with the individual” (p. 2) (see prediction 14.12a 
and b). Importantly, Kinney and Tanaka (2009) also hypothesize why sexual inhibitions are 
often seen in depressed patients. Loss of sexual desire, they claim, hinders exposure to 
sexually transmitted pathogens (prediction 14.13). 
The third ‘survival promoting’ aspect of depression and sickness behaviors is 
hypervigilance. Challenging the notion of conservation-withdrawal, MDD patients often have 
metabolically expensive symptoms such as anxiety and insomnia (Raison & Miller, 2012). 
This is paradoxical. Why would a depressed patient, with activated pathogenic defense 
systems, also show costly symptoms of agitation and sleeplessness? Raison and Miller (2012, 
p. 11) contend that “inflammatory processes-especially when chronic—might promote 
hypervigilant behavior that, while shunting energy away from fighting infection, would 
nonetheless serve adaptive purposes by protecting against environmental dangers engendered 
by sickness”. In other words, agitation is activated under chronic, long-term inflammation 
(prediction 14.5b). According to Raison and Miller (2012) this allows the infected person to 
pursue reproductively relevant resources (mates, children, food acquisition) before it is too 
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late. Along with colleges, Raison (2010) and Miller themselves conducted a study where 
patients infected with the Hepatitis-C virus were administered interferon-alpha (to promote 
inflammatory responses) over 12 weeks. Supporting their notion, patients in the treatment 
group, measured at 12 weeks, showed an increase in wake after sleep onset (WASO), 
decreased sleep efficiency and reduced stage 3/4 sleep. This suggests that hypervigilant 
behavior, at least in terms of wakefulness, kicks in after prolonged secretion of pro-
inflammatory cytokines. 
Anorexia, lastly, is thought to enhance survival during infection by spending available 
metabolic energy on inflammation and fever rather than food procurement and digestion (see 
prediction 14.5c). Additionally, Raison and Miller (2012) postulate, it limits the exposure to 
food-borne pathogens. In support of their proposition they cite Murray and Murray (1979) 
who force-feed infected mice and found increased mortality rates.   
The PATHOS-D framework can explain why depressive symptoms, including MDD, 
are associated with inflammatory responses. Additionally, Raison and Miller (2012) argue, it 
explains why the depression-alleles have not spread to every human being (fixation). Because 
inflammation-causing alleles can, among other dangers, cause tissue damage and chronic 
disease, they are expected to show an intermediate prevalence reflecting their benefit and 
costs in different environments. 
There are some noteworthy limitations of the PATHOS-D perspective. If depression 
is a side effect of inflammatory responses to infection, why are psychosocial stressors 
predicting depressive episodes? Raison and Miller (2012, p. 7) propose that this link exists 
because the “vast majority of stressors in mammals over evolutionary time boiled down to 
risks inherent in hunting, being hunted or fighting conspecifics in dominance hierarchies for 
reproductive access/status, it is not surprising that these states are also circumstances in 
which the risks of pathogen invasion-and subsequent death from infection-was greatly 
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increased as a result of traumatic opening of the protective skin barrier from wounding”. 
Thus, the PATHOS-D model predicts that the long-lasting statistical relationship between the 
fight/flight response and open wounds, created an evolutionary shotgun-solution: 
Inflammatory cytokines are released whenever there is a stressor in the environment (see 
prediction 14.4 and 14.10). Raison and Miller (2012) do not make it clear what “psychosocial 
stress” entails. Presumably, the PATHOS-D predicts that the reduced mood observed in 
humans after “psychosocial stress” such as the loss of a mate or family member are to be 
considered side-effects of pathogen defense. This weakness propagates: Raison and Miller 
typically examine MDD, without explicitly discussing whether their hypothesis also attempts 
to explain the existence of low-mood, chronic depression (dysthymia), uni and bipolar 
depression, and so on. Further, inflammatory markers are not present in all patients diagnosed 
with MDD. Raison and Miller (2012) suggests that this might be because MDD patients with 
elevated inflammation represent a distinct evolutionary subset in which selection for host 
defense happened primarily for individuals with the risk-alleles. The case is clearly not 
settled here. Also, noting that mania and psychosis are associated with depression, Raison 
and Miller (2012) find it hard to imagine that these states are adaptive for pathogen host 
defense. I find it hard to disagree. It is worth noting, too, that depressive episodes have been 
connected to cognitive impairment (Austin et al., 2001; Hammar & Årdal, 2009), and that 
some impairment remains even six months after the depressive symptoms have lifted 
(Hammar et al., 2003). These findings are equally hard to prescribe an adaptive function in 
this perspective. However, it could be argued that even though depression can cause, or at 
least is related to, cognitive impairment, the fitness benefits strengthening host defense might 
outweigh any costs of impaired cognitive abilities. In the infection-prevention perspective it 
is unclear too (not even mentioned), why women would be more depressed than men.    
All of the findings above shed valuable light on the validity of the PATHOS-D 
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hypothesis. Nevertheless, it is still necessary that skilled researchers and clinicians design 
experiments to test predictions explicitly derived from the PATHOS-D. Relying on existing 
data that fits the hypothesis is not sufficient; many hypothesis are easily verified, fewer stand 
after attempts of falsification.  
Nonadaptive Theories 
Nettle’s Affective Reactivity Model 
Nettle’s (2004) model is simple: complex, fitness relevant traits are likely to vary 
between people. Hence, there is an adaptive peak (a normal distribution of fitness) where 
most individuals have the perfectly functioning or close-to-perfectly-functioning adaptive 
trait, while some individuals fall on both extremes of the optimal range. Nettle (2004, p. 98) 
provide the example of height in men, based on some of his earlier work (Nettle, 2002): 
“reproductive fitness increases steeply with increasing height, until a certain point, above 
which the prevalence of musculo-skeletal and other health problems becomes very much 
greater”. Nettle (2004) argues that this is true also of the personality trait neuroticism, which 
is strongly associated with depression: “increasing neuroticism is selected for, because of its 
beneficial effects on striving in interpersonal contexts, until the point where the negative 
effects of mental and physical illness outweigh the marginal benefits”. In this view, 
depression (at least severe) is maladaptive variation. If this hypothesis is true, we would 
expect that many people suffer fitness-cost caused by too little, or too much neuroticism 
(prediction 15.1).  
Mutation-Selection Balance and Major Depression. 
All the complex behavioral traits that vary amongst humans (e.g. personality, 
intelligence) that have been studied so far, are heritable to some degree (Turkheimer, 2000). 
Behavioral genetics can explain why humans differ, but its research methods (e.g. twin 
studies) is limited because they cannot explain universal human nature (Pinker, 2003). The 
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study of universal human nature has been the purview of evolutionary psychology. As we 
have seen, species-typical adaptations are, of course, heritable, but most adaptations have low 
“heritability”, because there is no genetic or phenotypic variation in the population, and 
hence, there are no particular genes that can correlate with variance in particular traits. The 
phenotypic variation that we observe amongst humans can be caused by mutations, and 
mutations are common and often harmful, as Keller (2007, p. 6) writes:            
most people reading this chapter carry one or more new mutations that impair fitness, 
that pervade every cell in the body, and that were not inherited from either parent. 
Sometimes these mutations are catastrophic to the phenotype, causing, for example, 
skull malformation and digit fusion (Apert’s syndrome) or short-limbed dwarfism 
(Achondroplasia). But most new, deleterious mutations have minor, perhaps 
unnoticeable, phenotypic effects, such as causing one to be a little less bright, 
attractive, or athletic.  
Even if deleterious mutations have a very small effect on fitness, it is evolutionary 
relevant (Keller, 2007): depending on how much, or little, the mutation effects reproductive 
rates, it will—and this is only a matter of time—disappear from the population (Garcia‐
Dorado, Caballero, & Crow, 2003; John Maynard Smith, 1993). This is why inbreeding is 
maladaptive: If individuals with the same mutations reproduce, the mutation rates are likely 
to clump up in their offspring, which makes them vulnerable to disorders (Miller, 2001). 
Can mutations explain why major depression exists? Many genes affect the human 
nervous system, and mutations are relatively common, and heritable—which makes it 
inevitable that some mutation will affect the brain, and hence, produce phenotypes which we 
recognize as harmful mental disorders. This leads, Keller and Miller (2006) to argue that 
mutation-balancing selection best explains common and heritable mental disorders, including 
major depression. It is important to acknowledge that Keller and Miller (2006) mean major 
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depression. Indeed, Keller & Nesse (2005) have argued that humans are capable of low-mood 
because it has been evolutionary useful, and is activated by adverse situations. If this is true, 
we would expect low-mood to be universal (the genes involved in its development have 
fixated), and it is plausible that it would prove to be universal. However, if major depression 
was an adaptation, we would expect the same thing: no heritability, and context-sensitivity. 
This is not the case—major depression is heritable (Sullivan, Neale, & Kendler, 2000), which 
fits well with Keller and Miller’s (2006) mutation-selection analysis. Applied to human 
mental disorders, mutation-selection models imply that “if a mental disorder appears 
maladaptive, maybe it really is maladaptive - and always have been” (Keller & Miller, 2006, 
p. 397). This line of reasoning fits well in the Harmful Dysfunction analysis: Psychological 
adaptations can malfunction, for example due to heritable mutations (and if it is also judged 
as harmful by the individual, or the culture at large, it would be considered a disorder in the 
Harmful Dysfunction analysis). Keller and Miller’s (2006) view contradicts hypotheses such 
as the Bargaining hypothesis and Analytical Rumination Hypothesis, where major depression 
is seen as adaptive in certain situations. Even though all evolutionary theorists agrees that any 
complex adaptation (including psychological ones) can dysfunction (Horwitz & Wakefield, 
2007), Keller and Miller’s (2006) analysis is the first to explicitly discuss mutations, and 
reconcile the potential adaptations of low mood and dysfunctional depression with modern 
behavioral genetics. The heritability of major depression requires an explanation, and Keller 
and Miller (2006) argue that mutation-selection is a good candidate for this. For example, it 
has been shown that unipolar depression (and stroke, epilepsy, cancer and schizophrenia etc.) 
is more common in genetically isolated islands (due to inbreeding) (Rudan et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, major depression, and other psychiatric conditions, is much more common in 
patients with traumatic brain injuries, than the general population (Rao & Lyketsos, 2000; 
Schoenhuber & Gentilini, 1988). Higher incidences of major depression due to inbreeding 
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and brain damage strongly suggest that major depression is a dysfunction. If major depression 
is an adaptation produced by selection (and depression’s risk-alleles hence are maintained by 
balancing selection, or on their way to fixation), depression is not expected to work better 
after brain injury. This is of course true of any complex adaptive trait, as Keller and Miller 
(2006, p. 401) put it “receiving a blow to the head, for example, should not lead to higher 
intelligence or attractiveness”. If the mutation-selection balance perspective is true, we would 
expect that individuals with major depression show evidence of a high mutational load in 
their phenotype, such as bodily asymmetry (prediction 16.1)  (this has been found in 
schizophrenia, see Yeo, Gangestad, Edgar, & Thoma, 1999), we would also expect that the 
children of individuals with major depression are more likely to have mutation-related 
disorders, especially if both parents have major depression (prediction 16.2). 
Keller and Miller (2006) provide an important point of view, which has largely been 
ignored by the authors of adaptive theories. Adaptive theories have, often implicitly, assumed 
that the risk-alleles for major depression were neutral amongst our ancestors (ancestral 
neutrality model) or maintained by balancing selection (frequency-dependency), or ignored 
the heritability problem altogether. Keller and Miller focus on the role of many, minorly 
damaging mutations (which ultimately affects phenotype and fitness), and how these might 
be connected to heritable and harmful mental disorders such as major depression, bipolar 
disorders and schizophrenia. Keller & Miller, of course, are not saying that mutations explain 
all instances of normal sadness and low-mood. Rather, if low-mood is an adaptation (which 
it, like other emotions, probably is), mutations might explain when someone fail to be sad in 
situations where they are expected to be sad (like someone who fails to be anxious when they 
are being attacked by a predator—the adaptation is not working). Hence, Keller and Miller’s 
analysis might prove to illuminate the dysregulation view that Nesse (2000), Gilbert (1992) 
and others have suggested for major depression: At low levels, reactive sadness and 
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depression are likely to be part of an evolved human nature. But it can, like any complex 
adaptation, including emotional ones, become dysfunctional, either by genetic mutations or 
developmental disruptions. Thus, it is not surprising that mutations can cause mood disorders. 
Future research must address how normal, reactive sadness develops and works. This will 
probably require both the lens of evolutionary psychologists (test hypotheses on universal 
human nature) and behavioral geneticists (explain differences, rather than similarities, 
between people) (Miller, 2010; Pinker, 2003). Although evolutionary psychology must, and 
has indeed begun (e.g see Buss, 2009; Buss & Hawley, 2010), to combine the two into a 
scientific marriage of both universals and individual differences in human nature. Both of 
these fields are likely to further our understanding of why normal sadness exists, and why and 
when this emotion turns into a dysfunction.  
Conclusion 
In this article I have discussed evolutionary theories on the ultimate function of 
depression and why it differs between the sexes. That is, the theories that attempts to provide 
testable answers to the question “why does depression exist?” and “why are there sex 
differences in depression?” Many of the theories overlap and share ideas (e.g. the “social” 
theories), while some directly contradict each other, such as the Analytical Rumination 
Hypothesis and the Mutation-selection balancing view, or the Bargaining Hypothesis and the 
PATHOS-D. This may be caused by several things. For example, the complexity of 
depression suggests that depression is a multifaceted phenomenon, which might make it 
unreasonable to put it on one continuum. The severity of depression, too, such as mild and 
major, might entail qualitatively different states (Wolpert, 2006). And depression could also 
be best understood as different taxonomies of functional depression (Kennair, 2003)— 
depressed mood can be multimodular. If depressed mood is an adaptation, it might have 
several functions, and, if depressed mood is a dysfunction, it might dysfunction in several 
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discrete ways. Hence, one ultimate theory might be unable to explain why all forms of 
depression exist. 
It seems likely that major depression, as suggested by the mutation-selection, 
affective reactivity, and dysregulation models, is a dysfunction, and not an adaptation. The 
adaptation concept may have been put to use prematurely by some theories. Nevertheless, the 
evolved function, if any, of normal sadness and milder forms of reactive depression is not yet 
understood either, basic research on depressed mood will inform our understanding of 
pathological mood. 
I hope empirical tests of the predictions in the appendix in this paper could serve as an 
empirical kickstart in furthering our understanding of why depression exists. Especially if 
researchers test the predictions by using many different methods from fields such as 
anthropology, paleoarcheology, biology, genetics, computer science, cognitive science, 
medicine and cognitive neuroscience. The field of evolutionary psychopathology is clearly 
not testing its ideas sufficiently; this field will only prove to be as useful as the empirical 
research it produces. We still do not know why depression exists. Fortunately, predictions 
exist and they have to be tested empirically. I am confident that tests of the evolutionary 
theories on depression will also inspire new scientific questions through serendipity. 
It is reasonable to conclude that the evolutionary lens is necessary when fully trying to 
understand when, how and why the functions of the mind fails to perform optimally, and 
furthermore, when the mind is functioning as designed. In the future, when mental health 
researchers are armed with a high-resolution map of the evolved cognitive and emotional 
architecture of human nature, we will be better equipped to understand why sadness and 
depression are prevalent, how they are triggered, and when it becomes a dysfunctional 
disease for individuals. This understanding is important not only for developing better 
psychotherapeutic and pharmacological treatments, but also for understanding why the 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES ON WHY DEPRESSION EXIST  89 
 
human capacity for sadness, ranging from the everyday-blues to full-blown major depression, 
exist in the first place; to expand our understanding of human nature.  
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Appendix 
List of all Predictions From the Evolutionary Theories on Why Depression Exists  
1.0. Predictions From the Social Competition Hypothesis 
1.1. Depressed patients will have hostile thoughts towards inferiors, but subordinate 
thoughts towards superiors (Price, 1967); depressives will also be fearful of superiors. 
1.2. Losing in competitive social struggles will activate the involuntary defeat strategy 
and, if the conflict is not resolved, results in clinical depressive behavior, thoughts and 
affects. 
1.3. Exclusion from social groups (f.x bullying) activates involuntary defeat and thus 
terminates ambitions for the future (friendship, sexual partners, promotions). Later inclusion 
and acceptance in a social group reinstates ambitions.  
1.4a. Depression is an effective social signal that is interpreted by others as “no 
threat” and “out of action”. 
1.4b. Depression (and “low mood”) actually inhibits aggressive behavioral from rivals 
and higher-ranking individuals (”superiors”).   
1.4c. Depression puts an individual into a “giving up” state of mind, which 
encourages acceptance (”yielding”) of the outcomes of social competitions, both cognitively 
and behaviorally, this behavior from the depressive leads to reconciliation of the conflict 
(Price et al., 1994). 
1.4d. If the depressives “yielding” is blocked and/or prolonged, the Involuntary 
Defeat Strategy becomes intense and is turn into the clinical picture of depression (Price et 
al., 1994). 
Proposed SCH predictions.  
1.5. Individual humans inhibit/remove subjective goals (sex, friendships, promotions, 
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education etc) in depressive states, but not outside of depressive states.  
1.6. Sudden loss of social rank (losing a professional authorization, pension) mediates 
negative thoughts about the self, and positive thoughts about high-ranking humans. 
1.7. Subordinate behavior, as a response to losing in social conflict in hunter-gatherer 
societies, lower the chance for death and/or physical damage. 
2.0. Predictions From Behavioral Shutdown Model and Incentive-Disengagement 
Theory 
2.1. Depression is activated in individuals that are unable to, or does not want to, 
disengage from an unreachable goal (Klinger, 1975; Nesse, 2000). 
2.2. Depression is frequent in people who lack alternatives to an unreachable goal, 
and who are anxious, duty-bound and ambitious (Nesse, 2000).   
3.0. Predictions From the Third Ventricle Hypothesis. 
3.1. If an individual loses social status, toxin(s) are released in their third ventricle, 
which produces depressive behaviors (Hendrie & Pickles, 2010). 
3.2. The toxin that is released in depression (especially prolonged depressive 
episodes) is likely to damage cells in proximity to the third-ventricle that are unrelated to 
depressive behavior (Hendrie & Pickles, 2010).  
4.0. Predictions From the Analytical Rumination Hypothesis 
First claim (complex problems trigger depressed affect). 
4.1a. Psychotherapeutic techniques which interrupts or avoid problem-solving 
thoughts will be less effective than therapy that encourages depressogenic problem-solving 
thoughts; encouragement of rumination should be more effective in relieving depressive 
symptoms than distraction. 
4.1b. Antidepressives should be less effective relapse-preventer's than problem-
solving therapies because symptom-reduction alone hinders the problem-solving properties of 
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depressive rumination.  
4.2. Psychotherapy that explicitly focuses on the identification, and solution to, the 
fitness-hindering social problems that triggered patients depression, should be more effective, 
in the long-term, compared to other “active intervention” therapies, which do not have this 
focus.  
4.3. Therapies where patients are encouraged to actively solve social problems in their 
life (regardless of the content of their rumination) are more effective than thought-pattern 
changing therapies. 
4.4. The content of intrusive thoughts in depression should almost always concern 
social problems in the depressive’s life, not general worries on nonsocial issues.  
4.5. Depressive episodes are activated by the presence of complex social problems. 
The intensity of an episode (minor-major) is mediated by 1. The number of present problems, 
2. The complexity of these problems (That is, the number of people involved and how 
close/important the involved individuals are) and 3. The avoidability of this problem (degree 
to which the depressive could have controlled the situation). 
4.6. Depressives that engage in upward counterfactual thoughts solve complex fitness-
relevant social dilemmas more efficiently than those who do not. 
4.7. Depression and sad mood enhances efficient problem-solving of complex fitness-
relevant social dilemmas.  
4.8a. Depressed individuals solve complex fitness-relevant social dilemmas 
analytically (split a problem into subproblems and solve them in a step-by-step manner). 
Because of this, depressives solve social dilemmas faster than non-depressives.   
4.8b. Feelings of sadness and depression are induced in non-depressed people when 
exposed to an analytically difficult problem. 
4.9. The degree of analytical difficulty of a social dilemma should correlate positively 
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with the intensity of the depressed affect. Hence, the more there are tradeoffs between 
cooperating and pursuing self-interest and the number of people to keep track of, the more 
depressed affect will be induced (Andrews and Thomson, 2009).  
Second claim (bodily changes to avoid disruption of analysis). 
4.10. People with a high Working Memory (WM) function, will solve analytical 
social problems faster than individuals with a lower WM function. Hence, WM scores 
predicts length of depressive episodes (negative correlation). 
4.11a. Because of a prolonged activation of glutamate neurons in the VLPFC (area 
involved in attentional control), depressives have increased production of astrocytic lactate. 
4.11b. The activity of the serotonergic neurons in the VLPFC should be high, rather 
than low, in depressives. 
4.11c. The VLPFC level of activation correlates positively with the severity of a 
patients depressive symptoms. 
4.11d. The longer a depressive episode lasts (and hence the activation of VLPFC), the 
more likely the patient will start craving food rich in carbohydrates. 
4.12a. The more anhedonic behaviors a depressive engage in, the more uninterrupted 
the depressives rumination are likely to be. Hence, anhedonia will predict how fast a 
depressive solve a complex social problem (Andrews and Thomson, 2009).  
4.12b. Anhedonia are induced in a dose-dependent manner, according to the 
complexity of the evolutionary relevant analytical task an individual are trying to solve 
(Andrews and Watson, 2009).  
4.13. Psychomotor retardation should be positively associated with rumination 
(Andrews and Watson, 2009). Hence depressives with strong psychomotor retardation will 
solve social problems faster than depressives without (given that the social problem they deal 
with are of similar complexity). 
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Third claim (depressive rumination solves the triggering problem). 
4.14a. Severely depressed people (e.g. diagnosed with MDD) will solve their 
triggering social problem faster than people with a less severe depressive state (e.g diagnosed 
with a minor depressive episode) 
4.14b. In experiments where mood is manipulated, participants effectiveness on 
solving fictitious social problems, will be determined by the strength of their melancholic 
mood (e.g. as measured on a depression scale). A very-sad group will outperform a sad group 
and so on.  
4.15. Expressive writing, where the focus is on writing down thoughts and feelings, 
should enhance the long-term outcome of psychotherapeutic treatments of depression because 
it enhances the problem-solving nature of rumination.  
Fourth claim (depression reduces performance on laboratory tasks because 
depressive rumination takes up limited processing resources). 
4.16a. Depressives will perform similarly too nondepressives on laboratory (e.g. 
neuropsychological assessments) tasks if their rumination is temporarily stopped. 
4.16b. Depressive rumination is very resistant to attempts of distraction, which leads 
depressives to perform badly at nonsocial tasks. However, depressives should outperform 
controls when the task at hand involves identification and solution of complex social 
problems 
5.0. Predictions From the Social Motivation Function (Social Navigation Hypothesis) 
and Bargaining Hypothesis. 
5.1a. Individuals with Major Depressive Disorder elicit help from a broad set of 
important social partners (Watson, 2008). 
5.1b. When genuine, honest help is provided to a depressive, the depressive episode 
will end.  
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5.2a. MDD is induced in an individual if that person has 1) a need for social for 
assistance and 2) conflicts with important social partners. 
5.2b. Because MDD serves as a strategy to manipulate others, depressives are often 
met with negative reactions from their social group (Hagen & Thomson, 2004; Watson, 
2004). The depression is usually resistant to those negative reactions. 
5.3a. Motivational hypothesis, Niche change: The number of family and friends who 
resist a depressives attempts to change their social niche (and to which degree), are positively 
correlated with the strength of the depressives symptoms. 
5.3b. If a depressive start to perceive that niche-changes is unnecessary or unfeasible, 
the depressive symptoms lifts (Watson, 2008).  
5.4. Motivational hypothesis, specific partner: A depressives symptomatology 
differentiates based on whom it is designed to lay costs upon, and hence to motivate that 
particular person to help.   
5.5. Depressive symptoms (in the long-term) are always reduced to the degree that the 
triggering problem is solved (degree of help extorted from allies and kin), or perceived to be 
solved.  
5.6a. Depression only helps to motivate people who are positively interested in the 
depressives fitness (relatives, partners). 
5.6b. People become more depressed when they are in conflict with partners who 
have a greater positive fitness interest in them (as measured by help received in the past). 
(Watson and Andrews, 2002)  
5.7. The lethal risk of suicidal behavior in a depressive increases depending on how 
effective the suicidal behavior is in recruiting help from their significant others (Watson & 
Andrews, 2002). 
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6.0. Predictions From the Social Risk Hypothesis 
6.1. Depression is a low-variance, risk-averse strategy which is activated in dire social 
situations. That is, situations where the depressives value/burden ratio is unfavorably low.  
6.2. Phenomenologically, a human that perceives herself as having a high social 
burden and low social value (low SIP), will experience low self-esteem and portray the 
typical “symptoms” of sadness and mild depression.   
6.3a. Perceptions, and threats, of social exclusion (e.g. from dyadic relationships, 
groups) leads to depressed affect.  
6.3b. The depressed state leads to a hypersensitivity of social loss (and more correct 
identifications when social risks are present), and not hypersensitivity to non-social matters. 
6.4a. When an individual is in danger of social exclusion, sadness, and mild 
depression decreases the likelihood that the individual is indeed excluded from their social 
group (Allen & Badcock, 2003).  
6.4b. Mild depressed mood increases the likelihood that the depressed individual 
preserves their social relationships.  
6.5. Any organism that lack the ability to calculate social value and burden should be 
less depressed (e.g. children, adults with pathologies, non-human species without this ability) 
(Allen & Badcock, 2003). 
6.6. Sad and mildly depressed individuals are more sensitive to social risk when such 
risks are present.  
6.7a. Social cues, such as facial behavior, voice characteristics, verbal content and eye 
gaze can signal exclusion and therefore induces mild depression in humans across cultures.  
6.7b. People who are mildly depressed have had more negative interpersonal 
encounters in their history than others (e.g. experienced exclusion, the social cues from 7a).     
6.7c. Negative interpersonal experiences always lower self-esteem first, which might 
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develop into mild depression later (self-esteem mediates depression). 
6.8a. People, and organisms in general, who lack the ability to calculate social value 
and burden, should either lack, or show less evidence of depressive behavior. Human 
children, or humans with specific brain/cognitive pathologies (which show evidence of 
deficits in value/burden calculations) should be less depressed.  
6.8b. Non-human species (most likely mammals with past social selection pressures) 
that are able to calculate social value and burden have a capacity for depressive behavior 
patterns. 
6.9. The lack of appetitive functions in depression (desire for food, sex and so on) 
reduces the depressives social burden, which makes other people less likely to exclude the 
depressive from their group.  
Nettle’s (2009) Predictions Relevant for the Social Risk Hypothesis. 
6.10. Mania and agitated depression is activated under extremely dire social 
situations, and therefore functions as a “risky” strategies when the social burden (low SIP - 
danger of exclusion) is dangerously high.    
6.11. If an individual perceives its situation as absolutely dire, it is more likely to have 
an agitated depression, or have symptoms of mania, if the individual perceives it’s situation 
to be merely “poor”, however, it is more likely to have retarded depression (slow 
psychomotor activity and thinking). (Nettle, 2009) 
Dunn, Whelton and Sharpe’s predictions (2012) on the Social Risk Hypothesis. 
6.12. Insecure attachment, unfavorable social comparison and social defeat should 
predict depressed mood. 
6.13. Insecure attachment, unfavorable social comparison, and defeat as predictors of 
depression would be mediated by self-esteem.  
6.14. Depression should predict and mediate three consequences in the social realm: 
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inhibited social risk-taking behavior, submission, and interpersonal sensitivity.  
Proposed predictions for the Social Risk Hypothesis.  
6.14. Individuals in a hunter-gatherer environment (as close as possible to the EEA), 
who fail to become mildly depressed when threatened with exclusion, are more likely to 
actually be ostracized, relative to individuals who react with mild depression. 
6.15. Socially reactive sadness and mild depression are not explained by genetic 
mutation or heritability (the genes predisposing for this are fixated; part of human nature), 
however, major depression (especially non-reactive) can be explained by mutation/genetic 
heritability. 
7.0. Predictions From the Reproductive Failure Theory and the Sex Difference in 
Depression (from Suarez & Gallup, 1985, p. 285) 
7.1. Because of greater genetic assurance, limited reproductive potential, and being 
required to make a greater biological commitment (e.g. pregnancy and child rearing), females 
should be more prone to become depressed in response to reproductive failure than males. 
7.2. Women who have had previous children should be less depressed in response to 
child loss (neonatal death, stillbirth, abortion, etc.) than childless females. 
7.3. Sterilization should produce depression in females, but be inversely proportional 
in severity to the number of surviving offspring. 
7.4. Within limits imposed by family size and availability of resources, pregnancy 
should tend to antagonize depression. 
7.5. Postpartum depression should be related to the extent that hospital and obstetrical 
practices simulate child loss.  
7.6. Since with increasing age women tend to remarry less often than men, depression 
in response to the death of a spouse should be higher in females than males of the same age, 
and should be more severe for childless widows. 
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7.7. The incidence and severity of depression during menopause should be inversely 
proportional to the number of surviving offspring and, other things being equal, should be 
less common in females who have become grandmothers by the time menopause occurs. 
7.8. Depression in response to reproductive failure should be tempered by the 
reproductive success of kin. 
7.9. In cases of infertility, child loss, or menopause, the adoption of a child, bringing 
foster children into the home, or even obtaining a pet as a child surrogate may have 
therapeutic value in alleviating depression since they allow one to act out the proximate roles 
of parenting and/or grandparenting. 
7.10. Divorce rates ought to be higher in couples who have experienced infertility, 
miscarriages, stillbirth, neonatal death, or menopause. 
7.11. The occurrence of depression as a response to reproductive failure should be a 
function of the extent to which a species is R- vs K-selected. 
Proposed complimentary predictions of the Reproductive Failure theory. 
7.12. The death of a child produces stronger depressive symptoms in women, 
compared to men. Particularly if 1. The child dies after menopause, 2. The dead child is the 
parent’s only child, and 3. If they have no grandchildren. The same pattern should be 
observed in men, albeit to a lesser degree. 
7.13. The loss of a child induces less severe depressive symptoms in younger women, 
than in post-menopause aged women. 
7.14. Women born without a uterus and ovaries, are relatively more depressed than 
women in general.  
7.15. Ovariohysterectomy, the surgical removal of the uterus and ovaries in women, 
induces depression (the severity, again, should negatively correlate with the number of 
children and grandchildren), the surgical removal of the testicles, orchiectomy, too, induces 
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depression in men. However, to a lesser degree than in women (men, too, show the same 
negative correlation pattern with children, albeit a much weaker one). This pattern should be 
observed cross-culturally. 
7.16a. Men with more feminine personality traits, and less circulating testosterone in 
their blood stream, should be more prone to developing depression in general, and 
particularly after reproductive loss. 
7.16b. Testosterone-agonists (metabolic steroids) have short-term antidepressive 
effects on both men and women. 
16c. Men and women on testosterone-agonists show less severe depressive symptoms 
after reproductive loss compared to men and women not on testosterone-agonists. 
Proposed tests of Suarez and Gallup’s (1985) ultimate functions (learning and 
help-elicitation. 
17. Females in hunter-gatherer societies who are depressed due to reproductive 
failure, receive more help from kin, than those who are not depressed (relevant for 
Bargaining Hypothesis too). 
18. Compared to males, females will be less likely to repeat the parenting behaviors 
that led to child loss (Females show a greater degree of behavioral flexibility after child loss).   
19. If a parent’s behavior was related to the loss of a child, such as failure to provide 
sufficient attention to dangers, protection, food and so on, the female’s changed behavior will 
be more related to future fitness, than if the male changes parenting strategies.  
8.0. Predictions From the Social Competition Hypothesis and Women’s Depression 
8.1. If women have equal social opportunities as men, the sex difference disappear 
(Price et al., 1994).  
8.2. Less economic and social inequality (e.g. hunter-gatherer societies) between the 
sexes reduces the sex difference in depression.  
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9.0. Predictions From the Analytical Rumination Hypothesis and the sex difference in 
depression 
1. Women, relative to men, spends more cognitive resources on avoiding social 
stressors (rumination), and are expected to be more depressed. However, in turn, they avoid, 
and solve social problems more effectively than men.  
2. Inadequate resources and absent support and protection from family and friends, 
particularly perinatally, should increase the rate of depressive episodes to a larger degree in 
women than in men.     
10.0. Predictions From the Bargaining Hypothesis and the sex difference in depression 
10.1. Women are more often victims of social manipulation. Especially in EEA-
similar (hunter-gatherer) environments where women resides with their husbands relatives 
which should lead to more conflict, this induces depression in order to solve the conflict and 
elicit help. 
10.2a. Depression (including MDD) is a safe and slow strategy for conflict-resolution 
for women, but to a lesser degree for men (Hagen et al., 2004). 
10.2b. Women receive more resources when they are depressed compared to men.   
11.0. Predictions From the Defection Hypothesis and the sex difference in depression 
(postpartum depression) 
Hypothesized etiological factors of PPD (From Hagen, 1999, p. 333). 
11.1. There is insufficient investment from the father, family or others to successfully 
raise the offspring 
11.2. There are problems with pregnancy, birth, or with the infant that indicate that 
this offspring may have low viability, that is, is unlikely to survive to reproductive age. 
11.3. Environmental conditions are poor for raising an offspring (e.g. harsh winter, 
insufficient resources) 
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11.4. There are large opportunity costs—investment in the offspring precludes 
investment in other beneficial activities. In this case, investments directed towards offspring 
would be more profitably directed toward: 
11.4A.existing offspring 
11.4B. The mothers own survival, growth and development, and thus her ability to 
invest in future offspring 
11.4C. Finding a better mate 
Defection hypothesis, part one (Hagen, 1999): 
11.5. Lack of social support should predict negative affect 
11.6. Low infant viability should predict negative affect 
11.7. Poor environments should predict negative affect 
11.8. PPD should be universal 
11.9. PPD is not a hormonal byproduct 
Defection hypothesis, part two (reduce cost). 
11.10. Mothers with PDD are 1. More likely to have thoughts of harming their infant 
(Hagen, 1999) and 2. Mothers with PDD are more likely to kill their infants. This risk 
increases if the PDD has not elicited social support, or if the infant is unhealthy/has 
deformities.    
11.11. Unwanted pregnancy predicts PPD. 
11.12. Mothers with PDD lose interest in their newborn child, but often not in existing 
children.  
11.13. Mothers with PPD mother less: caring behaviors decrease. 
Defection hypothesis, Part three (negotiation). 
11.14. PDD predicts greater investments from the depressed woman’s social group, 
particularly from the father. 
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Proposed group-level predictions of the Defection Hypothesis: 
11.15a. The variables investing father and Healthy infant should both be causal 
factors in decreasing the risk for PPD in all mothers.  
11.15b. Conversely, the variables non-investing father and unhealthy infant strongly 
predicts PDD in mothers.  
11.16. Societies where single-motherhood is more common, have more incidences of 
postpartum depression, particularly if these mothers do not receive benefits from the state (or 
anyone else). 
12.0 Predictions From the Social Risk Hypothesis and the Sex Difference in Depression 
12.1a. Social thwarting of important, evolutionary biological goals (reproduction, 
survival, resource acquisition, kin investment and so on) activates risk-averse social strategies 
(manifested as depression) in humans;  
12.1b. These depressive, risk-averse social strategies help an individual achieve their 
biological goals (Relative to humans who respond by non-depression strategies when their 
biological goal are thwarted); 
12.1c. These strategies are particularly useful for women - women are more likely to 
attain their biological goals with risk-averse social strategies than men. 
12.2. Women are more likely to perceive social threats, and make negative self-
evaluations on the basis of it (Allen & Badcock, 2003). 
13.0 Predictions From Sexual Selection Theory and the Sex Difference in Depression 
(from Martel, 2013, p. 1239) 
13.1. Adolescent stressors will have a particularly prominent effect on adolescent-
onset internalizing disorders and associated sexually selected traits (i.e., negative 
emotionality, empathy, rumination) for females compared to males (sex as moderator). 
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 13.2. Rising levels of ovarian hormones will interact with the HPA axis and cortisol 
and oxytocin (moderators) to increase sensitivity to the interpersonal environment during 
adolescence via increasing negative emotionality, empathy, and rumination (mediators; 
mediated moderation), particularly for females (sex as moderator; moderated mediation). 
 13.3. Ovarian hormones directly and indirectly via interactions with cortisol and 
oxytocin will influence amygdala function and serotonergic neurotransmission, with 
particularly adverse effects on negative emotionality, empathy, rumination, and adolescent-
onset internalizing disorders in response to interpersonal stressor exposure, particularly for 
those with genetic risk influencing the serotonergic neurotransmission system. 
13.4a. Females will be differentially susceptible to stressors that provide information 
about the cohesion of interpersonal relationships (e.g., social support, intimacy) at puberty, 
compared to males, because they have a large impact on intrasex competition, mate choice 
and retention, pregnancy, and child-rearing, and these stressors will impact the sexually 
selected traits of negative emotionality, empathy, and rumination, traits that can facilitate the 
development of interpersonal relationships and increase risk for adolescent-onset 
internalizing disorders.  
13.4b. Thus, interpersonal stressors (IV) will influence negative emotionality, 
empathy, and rumination (mediators), particularly in females compared to males (sex as a 
moderator), and these traits will increase risk for adolescent-onset internalizing disorders 
(mediated moderation model). 
13.5. Culture will play a particularly important role in influencing the types, intensity, 
and chronicity of interpersonal stressors encountered during puberty and adolescence and will 
exert strong effects on the sexually selected traits of negative emotionality, empathy, and 
rumination, as well as prevalence of adolescent-onset internalizing disorders.  
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14.0. Predictions From the Infection-Prevention Perspectives. 
From Raison and Miller (2012): 
14.1a. Allelic risk variants for depression should be located in genes with known 
immune effects.  
14.1b. Allelic risk variants for depression should Increase signaling in inflammatory 
defense pathways. 
14.1c. Allelic risk variants for depression should increase survival in the context of 
infection. 
14.2. Depression should be associated with increased inflammation and inflammatory 
activation should induce depression. 
14.3. Allelic variants that increase the risk for MDD should enhance host defense 
mechanisms in general and innate immune inflammatory responses in particular 
14.4. Genes promoting inflammatory responses following psychosocial stress should 
decrease in prevalence in societies where associations between stress and infection are 
reduced (because of health practices etc) 
14.5a. MDD patients have elevated body temperature and reduced bodily iron stores.  
14.5b. Vigilant behavior (and stress hormones) is only activated in depressives when 
the depressive, inflammatory response has been prolonged over a long time.  
14.5c. Anorexia in depression help to defend against infections more effectively; 
anorexic depressives , relative to non-anorexic depressives, are less likely to die from 
infectious agents. 
Proposed predictions of the infection-prevention views. 
14.6. Humans diagnosed with MDD are more likely to have an infection, but less 
likely to die from infection, compared to infected non-depressed individuals. 
14.7. Depressed people are more likely to have an infection; but non-infected 
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depressed individuals are less likely to suffer from infectious diseases; depressive behaviors 
reduce the chance of being infected. 
14.8a. Individuals from populations with relatively higher prevalence of infectious 
disorders (e.g. Malaria in sub-saharan Africa) are more likely to show depressive symptoms.  
14.8b. Individuals from populations where depression is relatively more prevalent 
(due to other reasons than pathogen-defense) have less chance to die from infection (after 
controlling for pathogen-load in the environment).  
14.8c. People with immunological deficiencies are less likely to be depressed, than 
people with normally functioning pathogen host defense.  
14.9. Body temperature and iron-depletion increases under a depressive episode, and 
down again at the end of a depressive episode. This correlation relationship is seen both 
within and across individuals, and is observable in all forms/severities of depression. 
14.10. Environmental stressors for humans in the EAA were reliably associated with 
open wounds, which still produces the current association between psychosocial stress and 
depression.  
14.11a. Antibacterial drugs alleviates depression. 
14.11b. Increased handwashing will indirectly lower the prevalence of depression in 
populations. 
Predictions from Kinney and Tanaka (2009) 
14.12a. Sons and daughters that perceive “sickness behaviors” in their mother should 
avoid her presence, and resume it when the sickness behavior ends. 
14.12b. Mothers are motivated to avoid their children’s proximity whenever sickness 
behaviors are activated. 
14.13. Depressed individuals should be highly motivated to avoid sexual contact, and 
thus avoid sexually transferable pathogens. 
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15.0. Predictions From Nettle’s (2004) Affective Reactivity Model 
15.1. Depression is caused by variation around the adaptive peak of neuroticism, 
hence, very low and very high neuroticism is associated with fitness-costs. 
16.0. Predictions From Mutation-Selection Balance and Major Depression 
16.1. Individuals with major depression have higher-than-average mutational load. 
Hence, they are more likely to have other hallmarks of mutation (such as physical 
asymmetry). 
16.2. Individuals with major depression are more likely to have children who have 
disorders caused by genetic mutation, especially if the spouse also has major depression. 
 
 
